



Industrial Control System Cybersecurity Risk Management

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Infrastructure Defense Product Development

Learning Objectives



Learn Industrial Control System Basics



Understand Cybersecurity Goals in Industrial Control Systems




Introduce Energy System Cybersecurity Driving Factors



Discuss Current Solutions and Trends

Risk Management in ICS





IN THIS CORNER, WE HAVE
FIREWALLS, ENCRYPTION,
ANTIVIRUS SOFTWARE, ETC.
AND IN THIS CORNER,
WE HAVE DAVE!!


HUMAN
ERROR

★ DATA ★
SECURITY

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Risk Management in ICS








Our goal as defenders

Reduce probability of a successful attack campaign that is material to the business, organization, or system...

A material issue has a major impact on the financial, economic, reputational, and legal aspects of an organization...

Risk Management in ICS





Industrial Control Systems are All Around Us



Simple Control System

Temperature Sensor



Thermostat




Temperature
Settings
(Up/Down)

Temperature
Display


HVAC




Protecting Your House




Protective Relays Clear Faults



What is a Fault?



Protective Relay Evolution



1902



1984



2024

Operator's Perspective



ICS Communications

Serial

- EIA-232
- EIA-422
- EIA-485

Frame Relay

PoTS Dial-up

Leased Line

SONET/SDH

Ethernet


Copper

Fiber

Radio

Satellite

Cell



Two Families of Technology

Information Technology

Highly dynamic environment

Tech lifespan of 3-5 years

Best attempt

Data driven

Controlled environments

Operations Technology

Highly static environment


Tech lifespan of 10-60 years

Failure intolerant

Machine Driven

Uncontrolled environments

LITTLE BOBBY



by Robert M. Lee and Jeff Haas

Components of Risk




Threat


Consequence

Probability

Threat Levels




Threat Landscape



ICS Attack Potential Impact





ICS Attack Potential Impact





ICS Attack Examples


Maroochy Shire

Stuxnet

Metcalf

Ukraine – Dec 23 2015

Risk Management in ICS






Dilbert.com @ScottAdamsSays




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Prioritize



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LITTLE BOBBY

by Robert M. Lee and Jeff Haas



ICS Cybersecurity Guidance



NIST

- Special Publication 800

NERC

- Critical Infrastructure Protection

ISA/IEC

- 62443
- 62351

Defensive Strategies

Process

Reduce
Attack
Surface

System
Architecture

Redundancy

Monitoring

Data
Correlation

Automation

Cryptography

Updates

Access
Control

Train

Physical

Backups

Re-Using IT Technology in OT Systems

TLS

X.509

LDAP

RADIUS

Syslog

SNMP

Why not TLS?


- **Many bells and whistles**
 - Easier to misconfigure
 - Creates extra attack surface
- **PKI based on x.509**
 - Hotbed for security issues
 - Irrelevant metadata for ICS
- **TLS 1.3**
 - No authentication-only cipher suites
 - PFS-only! No passive monitoring



“Bugs are not randomly distributed; certain flaming hoops are reliably problematic” - [Dan Kaminsky](#)

<https://www.ioactive.com/pdfs/PKILayerCake.pdf>

Reinventing IT Technologies for ICS




Software Defined Networking

IPsec

MACsec

OAuth


System Level Approach



L7 : People



Risk Management in ICS



DID YOU SAY

**WE ARE
MEETING GOAL?**



Test

Table Top Exercises

Failure/Recovery Exercises

Penetration Test (NOT ON A LIVE SYSTEM!!!!)

Parting Message



ICS cybersecurity has unique considerations



Application awareness is key



Challenging environment for cybersecurity



Tremendous room for innovation



Questions?