Does Working Cause Women To Vote Less and Become More Politically Conservative?

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Abstract

While the correlation between working and voting is positive, I provide some of the first evidence that the causal relationship for individuals is negative. Instrumenting for working using EITC expansions and welfare reform, I find that working women are less likely to vote and become more politically conservative. Consistent with these effects, I find decreases in being registered to vote, civic participation, and political knowledge, and increased preferences for conservative government policies. Effects are driven by younger, White, lower-educated mothers, and are consistent across four data sources that span five decades. Overall, working leads to more votes for Republicans and less votes for Democrats. While recent decades have seen more and more women voting Democrat, even more women would have voted Democrat if not for decades of pro-work public policy targeting lower-income mothers.

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Workers are more likely to vote than non-workers: does this correlation reflect group composition or the causal effect of working on voting? Surprisingly little evidence exists on this topic, and most research relies on correlations or aggregate county-level data. This paper is the first to examine how plausibly exogenous increases in employment affects individual voting behavior and political preferences. Using four data sources that span five decades, I find that working causes women to vote less, and to identify as more conservative and Republican. These changes appear to be driven by the increased value of workers' time, less political knowledge, and preferences for conservative government policies. On net, less women vote Democrat and more vote Republican. While recent decades have seen more and more women voting Democrat (Cascio and Shenhav, 2020), even more women would have voted Democrat—instead of Republican—if not for decades of pro-work public policy targeting lower-income mothers.

While existing research has examined how working affects various important outcomes for adults and kids,[1] little evidence exists on how working affects voting—one of the most important responsibilities in a democracy. Charles and Stephens (2013) examined how strong/weak labor markets affected county-level voter turnout, but I am not aware of any research on how exogenous changes in individual employment affect voting and political identity.

Whether working increases or decreases voting is theoretically ambiguous. On one hand, work and higher time costs may lower voter turnout (Downs, 1957). Charles and Stephens (2013) finds that stronger local labor markets lead to less political knowledge and voting. On the other hand, workers may gain a stronger sense of agency and civic duty. Corman et al. (2017) finds that welfare reform increased working and voting. Cebula and Toma (2006) finds a positive correlation between female working and voting, and attributes this pattern to workers' increased knowledge and awareness of the economy and public policy.

The impact of working on political preferences is also theoretically ambiguous, and it is not obvious whether working should have any effect at all. Workers' attitudes towards government policy and political parties may be influenced by coworkers, paying taxes, family

[1] Working reduces fertility, stress, poverty, and criminal activity (Jensen, 2012; Evans and Garthwaite, 2014; Blattman et al., 2017; Hoynes and Patel, 2018; Agan and Makowsky, 2018), improves health (Hoynes et al., 2015; Averett and Wang, 2018; Braga et al., 2020), and improves the education, earnings, and well-being of their kids (Blau, 1999; Rege et al., 2011; Majlesi, 2016; Bastian and Michelmore, 2018).

situation, etc. For example, workers may want to lower their taxes and/or increase childcare subsidies and parental leave, which could push them in opposite political directions.

To examine how exogenous increases in employment affect voting behavior, I rely on plausibly exogenous policy changes known to have increased maternal employment: four decades of Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) expansions and 1990s welfare reform (Meyer and Rosenbaum, 2001; Grogger, 2003, 2004; Bastian and Jones, 2021).

I start by investigating whether voting was affected by the large EITC expansions and welfare reform of the 1990s, by plotting unadjusted annual voting trends, by number of kids (Figure 1 panel A). In the decade before these large policy changes, mothers voted at higher rates than women without kids—and those with 2+ kids voted more than those with 1 kid, but with parallel flat trends (p-value=0.53). During the 1990s—after these policies began to take effect—mothers with 1 and 2+ kids became 2.2 and 3.1 percentage points **less likely to vote**, relative to women without kids (p-values < 0.001). These trends look similar with or without controls (Figure 1 panel B), and for both presidential and midterm elections (Figure 2). I find a similar 1990s pattern—with or without controls—that mothers became less likely to identify as Democrat and more likely to identify as Republican (Figures 3–4). These trends strongly suggest that something in the 1990s affected the voting behavior and political identity of mothers.

In addition to the large 1990s policy changes, I also use the 2009 federal EITC expansion and dozens of state EITC policy changes. Since these (smaller) changes represent staggered treatment, it is important to look at voting trends before and after these policy changes, since variation in treatment timing can lead to contamination by picking up effects from other periods (Sun and Abraham, 2020; Callaway and Sant'Anna, 2020; Goodman-Bacon, 2021). Leading up to the 2009 federal EITC expansion, I find parallel voting trends by number of kids (p-value = 0.64); after 2009, I find a 1.8 percentage point decrease in voting among treated mothers with 3+ kids (Figure 5). Similarly, in the years leading up to a state EITC expansion, I find parallel voting trends by number of kids (p-value = 0.99). In the years after a state EITC expansion, mothers with 1 and 2+ kids became 1 and 2.5 percentage points less likely to vote. These trends look similar with or without controls (Figure 6).

After showing these trends, I condense annual effects into a single estimate: my preferred

identification strategy uses federal and state policy variation in EITC or welfare eligibility (see sections 3 and 5.5). I create $MaxEITC$ as equal to a family's maximum possible EITC benefits. $MaxEITC$ combines all EITC policy changes into one continuous treatment variable, as done by previous research (Hoynes et al., 2015; Bastian and Lochner, 2020; Agostinelli et al., 2020). $MaxEITC$ is determined by year, state, and number and age of children, and is independent of income and actual EITC eligibility, which are endogenous with socioeconomic status and the outcomes of interest. I also create the variable $Waiver$, which equals one for families living in states that had implemented a welfare waiver. For both $MaxEITC$ and $Waiver$, I use OLS and IV to estimate average and subgroup effects using difference-in-differences (DD) and event-study approaches.

I find that EITC expansions and welfare reform led mothers to work more and vote less. Using OLS, I find that each \$1,000 in $MaxEITC$ decreased voting by 0.5 percentage points, and $Waiver$ decreased voting by 1.1 percentage points. Using an IV approach that uses EITC and welfare policy as an instrument for working, I cannot rule out that each marginal worker stops voting. Consistent with these results, I also find decreases in being registered to vote, civic participation, and political knowledge.

I also find these pro-work policies increased identifying as—and voting for—Republicans, and decreased identifying as—and voting for—Democrats. Each \$1,000 in $MaxEITC$ decreased identifying as a Democrat and a liberal (-1.7 and -1.2 percentage points) and increased identifying as a Republican and a conservative (1.1 and 0.6 percentage points). Similarly, $Waiver$ decreased being a Democrat and a liberal (-3.9 and -1.1 percentage points) and increased being a Republican and a conservative (4.5 and 1.3 percentage points). Consistent with these results, I find increased preferences for conservative government policy.

Results are consistent across four data sources: Current Population Survey data shows decreased voting and voter registration; General Social Survey data shows decreased voting, knowledge about political issues, and identifying as a liberal and Democrat, as well as increased identifying as a conservative and Republican; American Time Use Survey data shows decreased civic participation; and American National Election Survey data shows decreased voting, decreased identifying as a liberal and Democrat, and increased identifying as a conservative and Republican.

Effects are similar for presidential and midterm elections, robust to various specifications and sets of controls, and driven by younger, working, White mothers with 12 or less years of education. While the largest policy changes happened in the 1990s, I find similar effects from EITC changes after 2000, suggesting that recent federal and state EITC expansions continued to impact female voting behavior.

Charles and Stephens (2013) is one of the only other studies to show that higher employment and earnings causally affects voting. They show that while higher county-level income and employment are correlated with **higher** voter turnout, within-county increases in income and employment led to **lower** voter turnout.[2] In addition to corroborating these results, I extend their work and the previous literature by providing the first evidence of how exogenous changes in individual employment affect voting behavior and political preferences. I also focus on women and look at voting up through the 2020 election, while Charles and Stephens (2013) pools gender and examines voting through 2000.

I conclude that policies that increase employment decrease voter turnout and increase identifying as a Republican and a conservative. Overall, more working women lead to more votes for Republicans and less votes for Democrats.

1. Review of Voting Research

Voter Turnout: Female voter turnout increased dramatically over the last century. Since receiving the right to vote in 1920, women were less likely to vote than men through the 1970s, as likely to vote as men starting in 1980, and more likely to vote in recent years (Cascio and Shenhav, 2020). This increase in voting reflects changing norms, higher education, and the replacement of older generations with younger, more-likely-to-vote women.

Voting is associated with numerous factors. Voting is positively associated with education (Dave et al., 2016), age (Cebula and Toma, 2006), and marriage (Wolfinger and Wolfinger, 2008). Previous research also shows that food stamps increase voter registration (Sugie and Conner, 2020), welfare reform increased voting (Corman et al., 2017), and cash assistance is

[2]They also cleverly use a small panel in ANES data to show that within-person changes in employment leads individuals to be less politically informed. The individual results come from observing about 1,300 people twice in the ANES, about 20 years apart (in the 1970s and 1990s).

uncorrelated with voting (Wolfinger and Wolfinger, 2008).

Voting is also associated with macro- and micro-economic conditions. People who lose their job during a strong economy are less likely to vote, perhaps due to stress (Incantalupo, 2011). However, voting increases when unemployment is high, perhaps because people want to voice their concerns about the economy (Burden and Wichowsky, 2014).

Empirical evidence on how working affects voting is mixed and theoretically ambiguous. Workers have less leisure time to vote and learn about elections, but may also gain a stronger sense of agency and civic duty. Cebula and Toma (2006) finds a positive correlation between female working and voting, and attributes this finding to increased knowledge and awareness of the economy. Rosenstone (1982) finds that higher wages and employment are associated with larger turnout. However, Charles and Stephens (2013) finds that this positive correlation turns negative when using within-county changes in wages and employment. They find decreased turnout for all types of elections—except for presidential elections—due to lower media intake and political knowledge.[3] Related, Bastian and Lochner (2020) finds that working mothers spend less time on civic activities—including voting—with their children (they do not look at total time spent on civic activities). See Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier (2000) and Hibbs (2005) for literature reviews of the economics of voting.

Political Preferences: Two important trends over the last few decades include the rise of working women and women identifying as more liberal, resulting in a growing political gender gap (Conover, 1988; Welch and Hibbing, 1992; Iversen and Rosenbluth, 2006). Men and women had similar party affiliations between the 1940s and 1970s.[4] Since 1980, women have steadily shifted left and men have shifted right (Kaufmann and Petrocik, 1999; Edlund and Pande, 2002; Box-Steffensmeier et al., 2004; Gillion et al., 2020). The gender gap in Democratic-party affiliation has recently climbed to 12 percentage points, due to changes in women's employment, education, and marriage rates (Cascio and Shenhav, 2020).[5]

[3] An older literature also examines the relationship between strong labor markets and voter turnout (Arcelus and Meltzer, 1975; Wolfinger and Rosenstone, 1980; Southwell, 1988; Radcliff, 1992).

[4] If anything, women in earlier decades voted to the right of men due to family values, religion, and other factors (Iversen and Rosenbluth, 2006). E.g., Prohibition was supported by women and pro-family groups.

[5] Non-working women are more likely to support policies that promote greater take-home pay for their partners (Iversen and Rosenbluth, 2006); women become less liberal after marriage (Edlund and Pande, 2002); and unmarried women have become more liberal over time (Box-Steffensmeier et al., 2004).

The modern political gender gap reflects female preferences for more government assistance for families, education, job creation, childcare and eldercare, and protection against unemployment, adverse health, and personal finance troubles (Shapiro and Mahajan, 1986; Chaney et al., 1996). While women and men have similar egalitarian, individualistic, and race attitudes, women are generally more altruistic and committed to helping society's disadvantaged (Alvarez and McCaffery, 2000; Aaronson et al., 2014). As a result, women's suffrage increased education spending and improved children's outcomes (Kose et al., 2021).

2. Data and Descriptive Voting Trends

2.1. CPS and GSS Data

I use 1976–2020 November supplements of the Current Population Survey (CPS), restricted 1975–2014 General Social Survey (GSS) data with state identifiers, and the sample of women ages 18–59.

Table 1 columns 1–4 shows CPS summary statistics for the full sample of 780,035 women, and the sample of 307,445 unmarried women.[6] In the full sample, the average age is 37.7, 58% are married, and they have 0.9 kids on average. 12%, 55%, and 33% have less than 12, exactly 12, or more than 12 years of education. 82% are White, 13% are Black, and 5% are another race/ethnicity. 59% voted last election, with 68% if the last election was a presidential election, and 49% for a midterm election. For the sample of unmarried women, the average age is lower (33.8), the number of kids is lower (0.5), education is lower, and the percentage White is lower, and the percentage Black is higher. The percent that voted last election is lower (51%), both for presidential and midterm elections (62% and 40%).

Table 1 columns 5–8 shows GSS summary statistics for the full sample of 19,319 women, and the sample of 8,004 unmarried women. The average age is 39.4, 62% are married, and they have 1.15 kids on average. 16%, 59%, and 25% have less than 12, exactly 12, or more than 12 years of education. 65% voted last presidential election, 78% are White, 16% are Black, and 6% are another race. For unmarried women, the average age is lower (38.7),

[6]November CPS data have 913,185 women ages 18–59, but when asked whether they voted in the last election, 133,150 have values of "refused," "don't know," "no response," or "not in universe." I drop these women from the sample, but results are similar when some of these answers are interpreted as not voted.

the number of kids is lower (0.92), the percent that voted last election is lower (61%), the percentage of White women are lower and the percentage of Black women are higher.

In addition to CPS and GSS data, I also use 1974–2004 American National Election Survey data, and 2003–2018 American Time Use Survey data (see sections 6.1 and 7.2).

2.2. Descriptive, Unadjusted Voting Behavior by Subgroup and Over Time

Figure 7 uses 1976–2020 CPS data to show unadjusted female voter turnout by age, kids, age of youngest child, education, race/ethnicity, and income. Panel A shows a steep age gradient: about 35% of young women vote, and about 75% of older women. Panel B shows that 60% of women without kids vote, 55% and 65% of women with one and two kids vote, and voting declines with more kids: only 52% of women with 6+ kids vote. Panel C shows an increase in voting as youngest children get older: 45% of mothers with infants vote, compared to about 70% of mothers with older teenagers. Panel D shows a huge voting-education gradient: 30–35% of women with less than 12 years of education vote, compared to over 80% for women with an advanced degree. Panel E shows similar voting by Black, White, and Hispanic women, and lower turnout among Asian and multi-racial women. Finally, panel F looks at total family income, total own income, and own earnings. For each income measure, voting generally increases with income, although voting is **higher** for non-working women than for working women with earnings under $40,000.

Figure 8 shows voting trends by state and by year. Panel A shows that state-level voting ranges from about 50% to 70%, with the lowest rates in West Virginia and Texas, and the highest rates in Oregon and Minnesota.[7] Figure 8 panel B shows a slight increase in voting starting in 2004. Panel B also shows that midterm election turnout is consistently 15–20 percentage points lower than for presidential elections.[8]

Voting trends over time and by number of kids is an important factor in understanding how policy changes may have affected voting. In Figure 1 panel A, I examine voting trends by number of kids. In each panel, the unadjusted voting trends of women with 1 and 2+ children are shown relative to women without children. In the 1980s, women with 1 and

[7] Related, people that move to higher-turnout areas become more likely to vote (Cantoni and Pons, 2022).

[8] I show voting trends over time—in presidential and midterm elections—by education, race, and marital status in Figures A.6–A.8.

2+ children were about 2 and 5 percentage points more likely to vote than women without kids. After 1992, I find a decrease in voting by mothers that remained stable through 2020. Mothers with 1 and 2+ kids became 2.2 and 3.1 percentage points less likely to vote. I find similar patterns for both presidential and midterm elections (Figure 2).

Trends in Political Identity: In Figure 3, I use GSS data and show unadjusted trends in female political party affiliation and political identity. While the sample size is smaller than the CPS data, the trends resemble those in Figure 1. After 1996, mothers with 2+ kids became **less likely** to identify as Democrat or liberal—and **more likely** to identify as Republican or conservative—than women with 0 or 1 kids. Trends in Figures 1–3 suggest that something affected the voting behavior and political identity of mothers in the 1990s.

2.3. Working and Voting: Positively or Negatively Correlated?

Figure 9 shows unadjusted trends in female voting and working. Between 1980 and 2020, the percent voting in presidential elections increased from the low 60s to the high 70s; and the percent working increased from about 50 to 60. Figure 9 also shows trends for the fraction that worked and voted; worked and did not vote; did not work and voted; and did not work or vote. The largest increase occurred for the working-and-voting group: rising from about 30% to 50%. The working-and-not-voting group was consistently about 30% of women. There are slightly more voting-and-not-working than not-voting-or-working women, though the fraction of women in each of these groups fell from about 20% to 10%.

Figure 10 panel A shows the fraction of women that vote, by their usual **weekly work hours**. Non-working women have the lowest voting rates (58%). Those working under 20 hours per week have the highest voting rates (62%), while women working over 50 hours per week have a lower voting rate of 60%. Working women vote more than non-working women, but conditional on working, women that work more vote less.

This unadjusted pattern holds for mothers, unmarried women, and all education levels (Figure 10 panels B, D, E, and F). The negative relationship between work hours and voting is strongest among working mothers (panel B). Interestingly, for working women without kids (panel C), voting does not vary by work hours. Perhaps working mothers find it difficult to both work and vote, while women without kids do not face the same constraints.

Does working cause women to vote more? Among workers, does working more cause women to vote less? Can the correlations in Figure 10 be explained by the composition of women that work? Panels A and B in Table A.2 explore these questions by showing the unadjusted and demographics-adjusted correlation between working and voting.[9] Columns 1–2 show that the raw correlation is **positive** (as expected from Figure 10), but is **negative** when accounting for demographics.[10] Panel B shows the correlation between work hours and voting, among workers. I find a negative (though not always significant) relationship between how much women work and how likely they are to vote.

State-Level Changes: Figure 12 compares 1976–1988 and 2000–2020 state averages of working and voting. The scatterplot shows states with larger increases in working women had smaller increases in female voting. While results are only marginally significant, each percentage point increase in working led to a 0.44 percentage point decline in voting.[11]

The analysis above looked at various **correlations** between working and voting. Later, I examine the **causal** impact of working on voting.

3. Federal and State EITC Policy Details

In recent years, the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) distributes over $60 billion to almost 30 million low-income families, and lifts 6 million people out of poverty (Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, 2019). EITC benefits are determined by annual household earnings, number of kids, state of residence, and marital status. Figure A.1 shows 2018 federal EITC benefits by earnings, kids, and marital status. The EITC contains three regions where: benefits increase with additional earnings; benefits do not change with additional earnings; and benefits decrease with additional earnings. Households with earnings above this third region—and households with zero earnings—are not eligible for the EITC.

[9] The relationship between working and has changed over time, as the composition of female workers has changed. Figure 11 shows the annual correlation between working and voting, both the unadjusted and demographic-adjusted correlation. The correlation used to be negative and has become more positive over time. 1970s working women were 1.5 percentage points less likely to vote. Each decade, the unadjusted (and adjusted) correlation between working and voting increased by an average of 0.6 (and 0.2) percentage points.

[10] Columns 3–14 in Table A.2 show a similar positive-then-negative pattern for non-mothers, married, unmarried, and higher education women. Interestingly, the pattern for mothers is negative and stable, with and without controls. The pattern is also negative for women with lower education.

[11] I weight by the 1980 state female population; the unweighted estimate is larger: 0.70 percentage points.

For low income families with 3+ kids, federal EITC benefits were worth \$0.45 per \$1 earned, reaching a maximum of about \$6,500 for those earning between about \$14,000 and \$24,000. For low income families with 2, 1, and 0 kids, benefits were worth \$0.40, \$0.34, and \$0.08 per \$1 earned, up to a maximum of about \$5,500, \$3,500, and \$500.

This maximum EITC amount—by number of kids—has changed substantially over time (Figure A.2). Notable EITC policy changes include the program's introduction in 1975, a small expansion in 1986, large expansions between 1993 and 1996, especially for those with 2+ kids, and a 2009 expansion for families with 3+ kids.

In addition to the federal EITC, over 30 states offered their own EITC as of 2020. In general, state EITCs generally top-up the federal EITC by a fixed percent, varying from about 3 to 40 percent.[12] Figure A.3 maps the cross-country expansion of state EITC rates (as a fraction of federal benefits) over time. Together, federal and state EITCs can be worth over \$9,000, with the average recipient receiving about \$2,500.

I combine households' maximum state and federal EITC benefit amounts into the variable $MaxEITC$.[13] $MaxEITC$ is determined by year, state, and kids; is independent of income or actual receipt of the EITC; and reflects exogenous policy variation. Figure A.2 shows the evolution of $MaxEITC$ over time, illustrating policy variation by family size, across states and years.[14] Figure A.5 shows a histogram of $MaxEITC$ for the full CPS sample. $MaxEITC$ for women with 0, 1, 2, and 3+ kids has an average value of \$320, \$2,770, \$4,050, and \$4,080; and a maximum value of \$840, \$5,610, \$8,620, and \$9,700.

Two key features of the EITC are (1) the federal EITC is larger for families with more kids, and (2) state EITCs are generally proportional to federal EITC amounts. These features yield rich policy variation at the state-year-kids level. For example, the 2009 federal EITC expansion raised maximum benefits for families with 3+ kids, which also increased state EITC benefits proportional to state EITC rates. Also, when states raise their EITC rate,

[12] I do not distinguish between refundable and non-refundable state credits. More general specifications allowing for differential effects by state credit refundability yield similar results.

[13] I use the CPI-U to adjust all dollar amounts for inflation to year 2018 values. While $MaxEITC$ is just one of several EITC parameters, it serves as a useful and intuitive summary measure of EITC expansions over the sample period. I also consider the EITC's phase-in rate as an alternative measure in section 5.3.

[14] $MaxEITC$ better captures EITC policy variation than a binary difference-in-difference (DD) approach (e.g., Kleven, 2019) for reasons discussed in Agostinelli et al. (2020).

they increase maximum benefits more for larger families due to the federal EITC structure.

3.1. Parallel Voting Trends Before/After Federal and State EITC Changes

Since *MaxEITC* is created using both federal and state EITC expansions, preexisting voting trends—by number of kids—leading up to state EITC expansions would be problematic for my identification strategy.

Figure 1 shows that pre-1992, mothers voted more than women without kids—and those with 2+ kids voted more than those with 1 kid, but with parallel flat trends (p-value=0.53). During the 1990s—after EITC expansions and welfare reform began to take effect—mothers with 1 and 2+ kids became 2.2 and 3.1 percentage points less likely to vote, relative to women without kids (p-values < 0.001). These trends look similar for both presidential and midterm elections (Figure 2). I find a similar 1990s pattern that mothers began identifying less as Democrat and more as Republican (Figure 3). Before the 2009 federal EITC expansion, I find parallel voting trends by number of kids (p-value = 0.64); after the expansion, I find a 1.8 percentage point voting decrease among mothers with 3+ kids (Figure 5)

Figure 6 panel A shows unadjusted voting trends before and after state EITC expansions. The horizontal axis in Figure 6 is event time, where time 0 is the year of a state EITC expansion.[15] In the 8 years leading up to a state EITC expansion, mothers with 1 and 2+ kids were about 1 and 4 percentage points **more likely** to vote than women without kids. I cannot reject parallel pre-trends for mothers with 1 and 2+ kids (p-value 0.99). In the 8 years after a state EITC expansion, mothers with 1 and 2+ kids became 0.9 and 2.6 percentage points **less likely** to vote. These unadjusted trends show that mothers were less likely to vote after EITC expansions, with larger effects for mothers with 2+ kids.

I also examine whether state EITC expansions can be predicted by state policies, economic conditions, or demographic traits. I consider states' unemployment rate, minimum wage, GDP, GDP growth, maximum welfare benefits by family size, and whether a state had a welfare waiver in place. Demographic traits include average number of kids, age, and the fraction married, White, Black, and less than 12 or exactly 12 years of education. I run re-

[15] Figure 6 omits states that never had an EITC, similar to the approach in Deshpande and Li (2019). While some states change policy more than once, I focus on the first time a state changes its policy.

gressions with and without one year lags of these variables. Outcomes include the maximum state EITC benefits or the rate that the states match federal EITC benefits. Regressions includes year FE, state FE, and state time trends. Across the four specifications, only 3 out of 90 covariates are significant at the 95% level (Table A.1). While I find little evidence of state factors predicting state EITC policy changes, I control for these state policies and economic conditions—interacted with marital status—throughout the analysis.

4. Empirical Strategy

I now describe my empirical strategy for estimating the effects of EITC expansions and welfare reform on women's voting behavior and political preferences. First, I use equation (1) to estimate annual effects—by number of kids—of 1990s federal policy changes.

$$Y_{ist} = \sum_{j=[1978,2020]} \sum_{k=[1,2]} \alpha_k^j \mathbb{1}(\#kids = k, year = j) + X'_{ist}\alpha_2 + \gamma_s^1 + \gamma_t^2 + \epsilon_{ist} \qquad (1)$$

Subscripts i, s, and t refer to woman, state, and year. I describe controls below. Estimates of α_k^j are the annual impact on voting—relative to women without kids—allowing me to examine pre- and post-trends. I expect to see parallel voting trends by number of kids up through 1990 or so.[16] Starting in the early 1990s, states began experimenting with welfare reform and there was a series of federal EITC expansions between 1990 and 1996, which impacted mothers, especially those with 2+ kids.

I also estimate equation (1) in event time, leading up to state EITC expansions that I normalize to occur in time zero (discussed in section 3.1).

After I estimate annual effects, I combine EITC policy variation into a continuous treatment variable ($MaxEITC$), and estimate equations (2) and (3) to summarize the results in one estimate. Essentially, $MaxEITC$ is a DD estimate that compares pre- and post-expansion years. Since there are multiple state and federal expansions (that apply to families with different numbers of kids), $MaxEITC$ provides an average of these DD estimates.

I use the following two regressions to estimate the effects of $MaxEITC$ on various out-

[16] Although there was a small EITC expansion in 1986 that could have had a small effect.

comes, Y_{ist}, for all women, and separately for married and unmarried mothers:

$$Y_{ist} = \alpha_1 MaxEITC_{ist} + X'_{ist}\alpha_2 + \gamma_s^1 + \gamma_t^2 + \epsilon_{ist}, \tag{2}$$

$$Y_{ist} = \alpha_1 MaxEITC_{ist} \cdot Mar_{ist} + \alpha_2 MaxEITC_{ist} \cdot Unmar_{ist} + X'_{ist}\alpha_3 + \gamma_s^1 + \gamma_t^2 + \epsilon_{ist}. \tag{3}$$

Mar_{ist} and $Unmar_{ist}$ denote married and unmarried mothers.[17] X_{ist} contains individual-level controls (e.g., number of kids fixed effects (FE), married, race/ethnicity, age, and education), while γ_s^1 and γ_t^2 reflect state and year FE. I also show that results are robust to state $\times$ year FE, state $\times$ number of kids FE, and interacting each control with marital status. The idiosyncratic error, ϵ_{ist}, is assumed to be independent of $MaxEITC_{ist}$ and marital status, conditional on other covariates X_{ist}, state FE, and year FE. I use CPS weights. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at the state level.[18]

Because the EITC is known to have larger effects on unmarried women's labor supply (Eissa and Hoynes, 2004; Bastian and Jones, 2021), I estimate separate effects of $MaxEITC$ by marital status in equation (3). Married mothers should not be considered an unaffected control group—at least *ex ante*—although it would not be surprising to find weaker effects on this group. While equation (3) interacts marital status with $MaxEITC$ to gain precision, I also show estimates separately for the samples of married and unmarried mothers (section 5.3). Like most of the literature, I assume that marital status is exogenous, consistent with the modest effects of the EITC on marriage (Nichols and Rothstein, 2016).

I leverage changes in the amount of treatment ($MaxEITC$) experienced by different families based on their number of kids, state of residence, and year. Women without kids can be thought of as the control group. I estimate intent-to-treat effects of $MaxEITC$ and not treatment-on-the-treated (TOT) effects of actual EITC amounts received by families.[19]

[17] I estimate other subgroup effects by replacing Mar and $Unmar$ with indicators for education, age, etc.

[18] Alternate clustering and standard error specifications yield similar results.

[19] I do not calculate TOT effects since $MaxEITC$ reflects changes in benefit levels, and changes in phase-in and phase-out rates. Families with different pre-tax income levels often face very different changes in after-tax wage rates when the EITC expands, and the EITC "treatment" is not the same for everyone.

5. Results: Voting Behavior (CPS Data)

5.1. Annual Effects of 1990s Policy Changes on Voting

To investigate whether voting is affected by EITC expansions and welfare reform, I first use equation (1) and plot annual voting trends, by number of kids.

Figure 1 panel A shows that mothers voted at higher rates than women without kids—before the large policy changes of the 1990s—and those with 2+ kids voted more than those with 1 kid, but with parallel flat trends from 1980–1990 (p-value=0.53). After 1992—when these policies began to take effect—mothers with 1 and 2+ kids became 2.2 and 3.1 percentage points less likely to vote, relative to women without kids (p-values < 0.001). Figure 1 panel A shows unadjusted trends, and panel B zooms in to 1980–2012 and shows that both unadjusted and regression-adjusted trends look similar. Using the full set of controls, panel B shows that after 1992, mothers with 1 and 2+ kids became 1.4 and 2.6 percentage points less likely to vote, relative to women without kids (p-values < 0.001). Figure 2 shows separate unadjusted trends for presidential and midterm elections.

In addition to federal policy changes, I also use state EITC policy changes (Figure 6). Since these changes represent staggered treatment, it is important to look at voting trends before and after these state policy changes (i.e., in "event time"). In section 3.1, I showed unadjusted trends, parallel pre-trends (p-value = 0.99), and that mothers with 1 and 2+ kids became 1 and 2.5 percentage points less likely to vote after a state EITC expansion. The trends look similar with the full set of controls: mothers with 1 and 2+ kids became 0.5 and 2 percentage points less likely to vote (with parallel pre-trends p-value of 0.62).

Next, I use $MaxEITC$ to summarize these annual estimates in a single estimate.

5.2. Effects of MaxEITC on Voting

In Table 2, I show the impact of $MaxEITC$ on the probability of voting, using the full set of controls. I show average effects on the full sample of women, and I also show effects by marital status, race, education, age, and year. In column 1, I show that each $1,000 in $MaxEITC$ decreases the probability of voting by a significant 0.5 percentage points (or 0.8 percent). Column 2 shows that this effect is completely driven by unmarried women:

the estimates of $MaxEITC$ for unmarried and married women are -1.5 and 0.1 percentage points. Column 3 shows larger effects for White vs Nonwhite women (-0.7 vs -0.1 percentage points). Column 4 shows large effects among women with 12 or less years of education (-2.0 percentage points), and null effects among women with over 12 years of education. Column 5 shows larger effects among women under age 35 vs women over age 35 (-1.4 vs -0.1 percentage points). Finally, column 6 shows that effects of $MaxEITC$ are a bit larger before 2000 than after (-0.9 vs -0.6 percentage points). This last result suggests that federal and state EITC expansions since 2000 continued to impact female voting behavior.

5.3. Robustness and Alternate Specification

Alternate Controls: Table 3 examines whether these results are robust to alternate sets of controls. Panels A and B look at average effects and effects by marital status. Columns 1–8 progressively add controls, with column 5 corresponding to the main set of controls. Column 1 controls for state FE, year FE, number of kids FE, and married. Column 2 adds controls for age cubic, race, and education. Column 3 adds controls for married interacted with state, year, race, and education. Column 4 controls for annual state factors (from section 3.1). Column 5 adds controls for married interacted with annual state factors. Columns 6–8 add state × year FE, state × year × married FE, and state × number of kids FE.[20]

Across controls, the impact of $MaxEITC$ on voting is between -0.44 and -0.77 percentage points (panel A). In panel B, the estimates for married women are between -0.51 and 0.02 percentage points, and the estimates for unmarried women are between -1.55 and -0.96 percentage points. While columns 1–2 estimates are larger, the other six are stable.

Alternate EITC Measures: Table A.5 uses four measures of the EITC: $MaxEITC$ defined by federal, state, or federal plus state EITC policy, and the federal plus state EITC phase-in rate. Across four specifications, I find that the EITC decreases overall voting (panel A), with effects concentrated among unmarried women (panel B).

Alternate Sample Years: Table A.6 shows the impact of $MaxEITC$ using different sample periods. Columns 1–5 use 1976–2020 (the full sample), 1976–1992, 1982–1992, 1988–

[20] Among other things, these fixed effects will flexibly control for state-by-year voting trends among the control group of women without kids.

1998, and 2000–2020. While magnitudes differ a bit, results consistently show that EITC expansions over time decrease voting, with effects concentrated among unmarried women.

Alternate Comparison Groups: Table A.7 restricts the sample to women with at least 0, 1, or 2 kids, as well as all sample years or years after 2006. Across specifications, $MaxEITC$ is associated with decreases in voting. Notably, effects are similar even when the sample is restricted to mothers, and when the sample is restricted to mothers with 2+ kids and years after 2006 (largely identifying off of the 2009 federal EITC expansion).

Isolating the 2009 Federal EITC Expansion: Similar to the last result, Figure 5 isolates the impact of the 2009 federal EITC expansion on moms with 3+ kids. Figure 5 shows the unadjusted 1998–2020 voting trend of moms with 3+ kids compared to (1) all other women, (2) all other moms, and (3) moms with 2 kids. Pooling the unadjusted effects before and after 2009, I find DD estimates between -1.8 and -2.1 percentage points (p-values < 0.01). I conclude that the 2009 federal EITC expansion decreased voting among moms with 3+ kids, consistent with research showing that the 2009 EITC expansion also increased the employment of this group (Bastian and Jones, 2021; Bastian and Lochner, 2020).

Restricting Sample by Marital Status: Table A.8 runs separate regressions on the sample of married and unmarried women. Columns 1 and 3 use the full set of controls, and columns 2 and 4 use the additional controls used in Table 3 column 8. Table A.8 shows significant effects of $MaxEITC$ on unmarried women (-0.49 and -0.51 percentage points), and largely insignificant effects on married women (-0.19 and -0.08 percentage points).

Alternate and Less-Parametric Specifications: Results above reflect an OLS specification. Table A.9 shows similar effects using a logit or probit specification.

Figure 13 shows a double residual regression, where two sets of residuals are created for each individual, averaged into centiles, and plotted against each other. One set of residuals comes from regressing voting on the full set of controls (excluding $MaxEITC$); and the other comes from regressing $MaxEITC$ on the full set of controls. This approach follows Cleveland (1979), and is a locally weighted non-parametric regression that down-weights observations with larger residuals. Figure 13 panel A shows relatively linear effects of $MaxEITC$ on voting, except for the endpoints, which are often noisy with this approach.

5.4. *EITC's Impact on Both Working and Voting*

Table 4 restricts the sample to women that have work and earnings data (from March CPS) and voting data (from November CPS).[21] The sample falls from 780,035 to 411,241. For this sample, \$1,000 in $MaxEITC$ decreases voting by 0.44 percentage points—similar to the full-sample estimate of 0.50—and increases employment, labor force participation (LFP), and positive work hours last week (0.34, 0.36, and 0.25 percentage points). These work estimates are not statistically different than the estimated effect on voting (at the 95 percent level). Interacting work outcomes with voting or not voting (columns 3–4, 6–7, and 9–10) shows that work increases can be fully explained by non-voting women. The EITC's effect on working and voting is small, insignificant, and negative.

5.5. *Welfare Reform's Impact on Working and Voting*

If working leads women to vote less, then other policies—besides the EITC—that affect work should also affect voting behavior. In Table 5, I look at whether 1990s welfare reform—which has been shown to increase maternal employment (Schoeni and Blank, 2000; Grogger and Michalopoulos, 2003; Grogger, 2003)—affected working and voting. State and federal welfare reform occurred in the 1990s and reduced available benefits and the length of time that families could receive them. Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) was replaced with Temporary Assistance to Needy Family (TANF) in 1996. States experimented with various welfare waivers in the years leading up to the federal policy change. Welfare reform is described in detail in Appendix C.

I restrict the sample to 1980–2004 and estimate equation (4):

$$Y_{ist} = \alpha_1 Waiver_{ist} + \alpha_2 Waiver_{ist} \times (\geq 2Kids_{ist}) + X'_{ist}\alpha_3 + \gamma^1_s + \gamma^1_t + \epsilon_{ist}. \tag{4}$$

Y_{ist} includes voting and the three working outcomes in Table 4. I focus on the estimate of α_2: the effect of living in a state with a welfare waiver and having 2+ kids, relative to women with 0 or 1 kids. I focus on mothers with 2+ kids since welfare reform had a larger effect on this group. I pool 2+ vs 0 or 1 kids to increase power, since the binary treatment

[21] CPS sampling has a 4–8–4 approach, where people are surveyed for four months, ignored for eight months, and then surveyed again for four months.

variable here has less identifying variation than $MaxEITC$. I show each estimate with just demographic controls, and also with controls for state-year factors (including $MaxEITC$).

Table 5 shows that welfare waivers increased working among women with 2+ kids (columns 1–6), and decreased voting (columns 7–8). I conclude that both welfare reform and EITC expansions increased maternal employment and decreased maternal voting.[22]

5.6. Impact of Working on Voting, IV Approach

So far I have shown that EITC expansions and welfare reform increased work and decrease voting. I now investigate this causal relationship with an instrumental variable approach. In addition to reflecting employment effects, the OLS approach above may also reflect income effects from EITC benefits for already-working women. I use $MaxEITC$, the EITC's phase-in rate, and welfare reform ($Waiver \times \geq 2Kids$) to instrument for working and examine how working affects voting for marginal workers. I show nine results, from combinations of the three instruments and the three binary measures of working from Tables 4–5.

Table 6 uses the full set of controls and shows that across the nine specifications, working causes the marginal worker to be 1.0–1.4 percentage points less likely to vote. The first stage estimates match the work estimates in Tables 4 and 5. $MaxEITC$ is highly correlated with the EITC's phase-in rate and while the first stage differs due to scaling, they yield very similar second stage estimates.[23] The first stage Wald F-statistics range from 12.1 to 24.0 for the EITC instruments, and a weaker 3.6 to 6.8 for the welfare waiver instrument.

6. Results: Political Identity (GSS and ANES Data)

6.1. Annual Effects of 1990s Policy Changes on Political Identity

To investigate whether political identity is affected by EITC expansions and welfare reform, I first use GSS data, equation (1), and plot annual voting trends, by number of kids. Figure 3 shows the annual difference in political identity between mothers with 2+ kids and women with 0 or 1 kids. Figure 4 normalizes the gap in Figure 3 to 1992 levels, and shows unadjusted and regression-adjusted annual trends (using the full set of controls).

[22] My results differ from Corman et al. (2017) that finds welfare reform increased voting, using NLSY data.
[23] Each 10 percentage point increase in the phase-in rate increases working by 0.3–0.6 percentage points.

Figure 4 panels A–D show parallel pre-trends between 1984 and 1992 for identifying as Democrat, Republican, liberal, and conservative (p-values 0.56, 0.46, 0.76, and 0.69). After 1992, mothers became less likely to identify as Democrat and liberal (-5.8 and -2.6 percentage points), and more likely to identify as Republican and conservative (3.9 and 1.8 percentage points). These trends look very similar with or without controls.

Next, I use $MaxEITC$ and estimate equations (2) and (3).

6.2. Effects of MaxEITC on Political Identity

Table 7 uses the full set of controls and shows that each $1,000 in $MaxEITC$ decreases identifying as a Democrat and a liberal (-1.75 and -1.22 percentage points), increases identifying as an Independent and a moderate (0.61 and 0.24 percentage points), and increases identifying as a Republican and a conservative (1.09 and 0.58 percentage points).[24] Columns 7–9 show that $MaxEITC$ also leads women to work more—as found in Table 4 with CPS data—and be less politically informed (as also found by Charles and Stephens (2013)).[25]

Subgroup Effects: In Figure 14, I find a similar pattern across subgroups (less Democrat, more Republican), with stronger effects on White women, no effect on Non-White women, stronger effects on women with under 16 years of education, no effects on college graduates, and slightly stronger effects on younger women (under 37) than older women.

Alternate Controls: Table 8 looks at whether these results are robust to the eight sets of controls used in Table 3. Across controls (with column 5 being the main specification), I find a stable effect on identifying as a Democrat (between -1.4 and -1.8 percentage points); identifying as a Republican (0.9–1.4 percentage points); being employed (0.8–1.3 percentage points); and being politically informed (between -0.03 and -0.06 standard deviations).

Alternate Specifications: Table A.10 shows that logit and probit specifications lead

[24]The underlying GSS variables take seven values: strong Democrat, Democrat, slightly Democrat, Independent, slightly Republican, Republican, and strong Republican. Panels A and C in Figure A.9 show the impact of $MaxEITC$ on all seven categories, and panels B and D replicate Table 7. While many of these results are not statistically significant, Panel A suggests a decrease in Democrat, slightly Democrat, and slightly Republican, an increase in Independent, Republican, and strong Republican, and a null effect on strong Democrat. Panel C in Figure A.9 suggests a decrease in slightly liberal, an increase in moderate, conservative, and strong conservative, and a null effect on strong liberal, liberal, and slightly conservative.

[25]I define politically informed by averaging 11 standardized variables (e.g., interested in politics, discuss politics, sought political information). Full details and individual-component regressions in Table A.11.

to similar estimates as OLS. Figure 13 panels B–D show a double residual regression (details in section 5.3). The locally weighted regressions show relatively linear effects of $MaxEITC$ on identifying as a Democrat, Republican, or liberal.

6.3. Using American National Election Survey (ANES) Data

Another commonly used data source in this area of research is the ANES. While ANES data spans 1948–2020, I use 1974–2004 since number of kids is given for 1956–2004 (except for 1972) and consistent definitions of political ideology are given for 1972–2020. I use equation (2), the sample of 18–59 year old women, and show summary statistics in Table A.12. ANES has rich data on voting and political ideology, but only about 800 annual female observations.

Table 9 uses two sets of controls—demographics, with and without state-year FE—and shows the impact of $MaxEITC$ on voting and political identity. Across controls, I find that $MaxEITC$ is associated with decreased voting; decreased identifying as a liberal, Democrat, moderate, and Independent; and increased identifying as a conservative and Republican. Although most results are not statistically significant (Republican is one exception), the point estimates align with previous results using CPS and GSS data.

6.4. Welfare Reform's Impact on Political Identity

If working affects political identity, then other policies—besides the EITC—that affect work should also affect identity. I use 1980–2004 GSS data and equation (4) to examine whether state welfare waivers—see section 5.5 for more details—affected these outcomes.

Table 10 shows that welfare reform significantly decreased the likelihood of identifying as Democrat and increased the likelihood of identifying as Republican, among women with 2+ kids. Table 10 also shows insignificant negative effects on being Independent, liberal, or a moderate, and insignificant positive effects on being conservative.

6.5. Net Impact of Turnout and Political Identity on Partisan Voting

So far I have shown decreases in voting and increases in identifying as a Republican, but it is not clear how this affects net voter turnout by political party. It is possible that the two effects offset such that the net impact on Democrat/Republican vote shares is unaffected. In

Table 11, I explore partisan voting with GSS data, equation (2), and the full set of controls. Panels A and B use the full sample and a younger sample of women aged 18–45. I construct the outcome in two ways: one, voting interacted with the party of the president that women voted for, and two, voting interacted with political identity. These two differ only for those that identify as one party but vote for a different party.

Among the younger sample, Table 11 shows that each $1,000 in $MaxEITC$ decreased voting (-0.92 percentage points), voting Democrat and third parties (-1.69 and -0.13 percentage points); and increased voting Republican (0.82 percentage points). Voting interacted with political identity shows a larger decrease in Democrat voting (-2.07 vs -1.69), larger increase in Republican voting (1.02 vs 0.82).[26] Among the full sample of women (panel A), I find similar effects with generally smaller point estimates.[27]

Overall, EITC expansions led to more votes for Republicans and less votes for Democrats. The interquartile effect implies that 3 percent of adult women vote for Republicans instead of Democrats, due to the EITC.[28] While recent decades have seen more women voting Democrat (Cascio and Shenhav, 2020), my results imply that 2 percent more women would vote Democrat—instead of Republican—in the absence of the pro-work EITC.[29]

7. Channels and Related Outcomes

I now explore why pro-work policies decrease voting and affect political identity.

7.1. Being Registered to Vote

I use CPS data and equations (2) and (4) to examine whether the EITC or welfare reform affected being registered to vote. Table 12 column 1 shows that each $1,000 in $MaxEITC$ decreased being registered to vote by an insignificant 0.1 percentage points. Column 4 shows that $Waiver$ decreased registration by an insignificant -0.75 percentage points. Table 12 also shows that these two policies decreased being registered and voting, and increased being

[26] I also find an increase in non-voting among Independents (0.67 percentage points), and small insignificant effects on not-voting Democrats, voting Independents, and not-voting Republicans.

[27] Notably, the percentage-point effects are smaller for voting (-0.13 vs -0.92) and voting Democrats (-1.27 vs -1.69), and larger for voting Republicans (1.05 vs 0.82).

[28] The 25th and 75th percentiles of $MaxEITC$ equal $500 and $3,500.

[29] Average $MaxEITC$ increased by $2,000 in 1980–2010 (see estimates in Table 11 columns 2 and 8).

registered and not voting. While not statistically significant, the point estimate suggests that less than half of the voting decrease can be explained by not being registered to vote.

7.2. Decreased Civic Participation: Evidence from Time-Use Data

Policies that increase labor supply will also increase the value of non-work time and decrease the time available for other activities, including learning about political issues, registering to vote, and voting. I find that $MaxEITC$ decreased being politically informed in Table 7 column 9. Charles and Stephens (2013) also finds that workers vote less because they are less politically informed; and numerous descriptive studies and lab studies also show that more political knowledge is associated with being more likely to vote (Palfrey and Poole, 1987; Wattenberg et al., 2000; Coupé and Noury, 2004; Battaglini et al., 2010).

I examine whether EITC expansions affect time spent on civic participation using 2003–2018 American Time Use Survey (ATUS) data and equation (2).[30] I show results for three sets of controls (corresponding to the controls in columns 2, 3, and 7 in Table 3). Columns 1–3 in Table 13 look at time spent working, and columns 4–6 look at time spent on civic participation (i.e., the narrowest ATUS category that includes voting-related activities.). Across specifications, each \$1,000 in $MaxEITC$ increases weekly work hours by 0.8–1.4 and decreases civic participation by 0.2–0.3 weekly hours (or about 10%).

7.3. Impact on Having Conservative Social Views

In Table 14, I explore various beliefs and social attitudes that may drive these changes in political identity. Over the sample period (1975–2014), the GSS asks hundreds of relevant questions, however many are only asked once or only asked of a small subset of people. These variables also vary in structure (e.g., binary or categorical). I choose dozens of variables that are each asked in at least three years, standardize them such that larger values denote more conservative views, and average these variables into five categories: government policy, feminism, views on race, other hot button issues, and religion. (Tables A.14–A.18 describe

[30] Table A.13 shows ATUS summary statistics for the sample of all women ages 18–49 (matching the sample used by Bastian and Lochner (2020)). Civic activities "include government-required duties—such as serving jury duty or appearing in court—as well as activities that assist or influence government processes, such as voting and attending town hall meetings. Source: https://www.bls.gov/opub/hom/atus/concepts.htm.

and show regressions for each subcomponent of these outcomes; obviously these variables could be combined and categorized in different ways.)

Table 14 shows that each $1,000 in $MaxEITC$ leads women to be 0.021 standard deviations more conservative on government policy;[31] 0.019 standard deviations more conservative on race/racism;[32] 0.012 standard deviations more conservative on other hot button issues;[33] 0.08 standard deviations **less** conservative on feminism (consistent with Bastian (2020)); and 0.43 standard deviations **less** religious (consistent with Silveus and Stoddard (2020)).[34]

8. Discussion

In this paper, I show that EITC expansions and welfare reform led mothers to work more, vote less, and become more politically conservative and Republican. As for channels, I find that these working women are less likely to be registered to vote, are less politically informed, and adopt more conservative attitudes towards government policy.

Results are consistent across four data sources: CPS data shows less voting and voter registration; GSS data shows less voting, political knowledge, and identifying as a liberal and Democrat, as well as more identifying as a conservative and Republican; ATUS data shows less civic participation; and ANES data shows less voting, decreased identifying as a liberal and Democrat, and more identifying as a conservative and Republican.

Effects are similar for presidential and midterm elections, robust to various specifications, and driven by younger, working, White mothers with lower education. Effects are evident before, during, and after the 1990s, suggesting that recent EITC expansions continued to impact female voting behavior.

I provide some of the first evidence that the causal relationship between working and voting is negative: new workers become less likely to vote, and more politically conservative. Overall, these pro-work policies led to more Republican votes and less Democrat votes.

[31] Table A.14 shows effects are driven by views on guaranteeing jobs; reducing income inequality; providing healthcare for all; helping the unemployed; cutting government spending; and reducing middle income taxes.

[32] Table A.16 shows effects are driven by views on affirmative action, and why racial outcome gaps exist.

[33] Table A.17 shows that effects are driven by views on marijuana, with insignificant positive effects on abortion and gay-rights, and insignificant negative effects on gun permits.

[34] The last two results are not significant. Tables A.15 and A.18 show sub-components of feminism and religion. See Figure A.10 for more detailed analysis of how $MaxEITC$ affects religiosity.

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Table 1: Summary Statistics (CPS and GSS Data)

Data	1976–2020 CPS Data				1975–2014 GSS Data			
Variables	Mean	Std Dev	Min	Max	Mean	Std Dev	Min	Max
Panel A: Full Sample of Women								
Age	37.7	11.9	18.0	59.0	39.4	10.6	18.0	59.0
Married	0.58	0.49	0.00	1.00	0.62	0.49	0.00	1.00
Number of Kids	0.90	1.21	0.00	9.00	1.15	1.26	0.00	9.00
<12 Years Educ	0.12	0.32	0.00	1.00	0.16	0.37	0.00	1.00
=12 Years Educ	0.55	0.50	0.00	1.00	0.59	0.49	0.00	1.00
>12 Years Educ	0.33	0.47	0.00	1.00	0.25	0.43	0.00	1.00
White	0.82	0.38	0.00	1.00	0.78	0.42	0.00	1.00
Black	0.13	0.34	0.00	1.00	0.16	0.37	0.00	1.00
Other Race	0.05	0.21	0.00	1.00	0.06	0.24	0.00	1.00
Voted Last Election	0.59	0.49	0.00	1.00				
Voted Last Pres Election	0.68	0.47	0.00	1.00	0.63	0.48	0.00	1.00
Voted Last Midterm Election	0.49	0.50	0.00	1.00				
Observations	780,035				19,319			
Panel B: Unmarried Women								
Age	33.8	12.5	18.0	59.0	38.7	11.0	18.00	59.0
Number of Kids	0.52	0.99	0.00	9.00	0.92	1.22	0.00	9.00
<12 Years Educ	0.13	0.34	0.00	1.00	0.19	0.39	0.00	1.00
=12 Years Educ	0.57	0.49	0.00	1.00	0.57	0.50	0.00	1.00
>12 Years Educ	0.30	0.46	0.00	1.00	0.24	0.43	0.00	1.00
White	0.75	0.43	0.00	1.00	0.66	0.47	0.00	1.00
Black	0.20	0.40	0.00	1.00	0.27	0.45	0.00	1.00
Other Race	0.05	0.22	0.00	1.00	0.06	0.24	0.00	1.00
Voted Last Election	0.51	0.50	0.00	1.00				
Voted Last Pres Election	0.62	0.49	0.00	1.00	0.59	0.49	0.00	1.00
Voted Last Midterm Election	0.40	0.49	0.00	1.00				
Observations	307,445				8,004			

Notes: Data sources: 1976–2020 November CPS data and 1975–2014 GSS data.

Table 2: EITC's Effects on Voting, Average and Subgroup Effects (CPS Data)

Subgroup:	All	Marital Status	Race	Education	Age	Years
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
MaxEITC	-0.50					
	(0.10)					
MaxEITC		0.08				
× Married		(0.09)				
MaxEITC		-1.45				
× Unmarried		(0.13)				
MaxEITC			-0.66			
× White			(0.10)			
MaxEITC			-0.07			
× Nonwhite			(0.11)			
MaxEITC				-2.00		
× ≤ 12 Years Educ				(0.15)		
MaxEITC				0.07		
× > 12 Years Educ				(0.09)		
MaxEITC					-1.38	
× < Age 35					(0.13)	
MaxEITC					-0.14	
× ≥ Age 35					(0.08)	
MaxEITC						-0.85
× Year < 2000						(0.16)
MaxEITC						-0.56
× Year ≥ 2000						(0.10)
R-squared	0.180	0.181	0.181	0.183	0.181	0.180
Observations	780,035	780,035	780,035	780,035	780,035	780,035
Equal Effects (p-val)		0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.011

Notes: Data source: 1976–2020 November CPS data. MaxEITC is in $1,000s of 2018 dollars. P-values from F-test for equal effects within each column. Full controls from Table 3 column 5 and include: state FE, year FE, number of kids FE, married, age cubic, Black, White, years of education, married interacted with state FE, year FE, race, and education; annual state factors (unemployment rate, GDP, GDP growth rate, minimum wage, welfare waiver, and maximum welfare benefits for families with 1, 2, and 3 kids); and annual state factors interacted with married.

Table 3: EITC's Effects on Voting Behavior, Alternate Controls (CPS Data)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Panel A: Average Effect on Voting (Mean=58.8)								
MaxEITC	-0.55	-0.77	-0.56	-0.51	-0.50	-0.47	-0.46	-0.44
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)
R-squared	0.079	0.178	0.180	0.180	0.180	0.187	0.189	0.189
Panel B: Effect by Marital Status (Married Mean=0.36, Unmarried Mean=0.49)								
MaxEITC × Married	-0.42	-0.51	0.02	0.07	0.08	0.13	0.15	0.17
	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)
MaxEITC × Unmarried	-0.96	-1.55	-1.49	-1.45	-1.45	-1.41	-1.40	-1.38
	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)
R-squared	0.079	0.178	0.181	0.181	0.181	0.188	0.189	0.190
Observations	780,035	780,035	780,035	780,035	780,035	780,035	780,035	780,035
Controls								
State, Year, #Kids FE	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Married	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Age, Race, Educ		X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Mar × (St, Yr, Race, Ed)			X	X	X	X	X	X
Annual State Factors				X	X	X	X	X
Mar. × State Factors					X	X	X	X
State × Year FE						X	X	X
Mar × St × Year FE							X	X
State × #Kids FE								X

Notes: Data source: 1976–2020 November CPS data. MaxEITC is in $1,000s of 2018 dollars. Controls discussed in Table 2 notes.

Table 4: EITC's Impact on Working and Voting (CPS Data)

Outcome:	Voting	Working			LFP	LFP	LFP	Work Hrs >0		
			and Voting	and Not Voting		and Voting	and Not Voting		and Voting	and Not Voting
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
MaxEITC	-0.44	0.34	-0.07	0.41	0.36	-0.06	0.42	0.25	-0.12	0.37
	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.07)
R-squared	0.182	0.006	0.076	0.089	0.006	0.082	0.098	0.006	0.072	0.085
Mean Dep Var	60.1	61.5	36.9	24.6	65.4	39.2	26.2	59.2	35.5	23.7

Notes: Data source: 1976–2020 March and November CPS data. MaxEITC is in $1,000s of 2018 dollars. Full set of controls used, listed in Table 2 notes. N=411,241 in each column. Sample restricted to women in both the March ASEC and November voting supplement. Working and LFP (labor force participation) defined based on work status in year $t-1$, positive working hours defined based on work status last week.

Table 5: Welfare Reform's Impact on Working and Voting (CPS Data)

Outcome:	Voting		Working		LFP		Work Hrs >0	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
State Welfare Waiver	-1.09	-1.49	1.63	1.07	1.98	1.44	1.43	1.16
× 2+ Kids	(0.56)	(0.79)	(0.57)	(0.75)	(0.56)	(0.74)	(0.54)	(0.73)
R-squared	0.178	0.178	0.008	0.008	0.008	0.008	0.008	0.008
Observations	279,898	279,898	279,898	279,898	279,898	279,898	279,898	279,898
Mean Dep Var	57.8	57.8	60.6	60.6	64.5	64.5	58.3	58.3
Controls								
Demographics	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
State-Year Factors		X		X		X		X

Notes: Data source: 1980–2004 March and November CPS. Sample restricted to women in both the March ASEC and November voting supplement (as in Table 4). Outcomes defined in Table 4 notes. Demographics refer to controls in Table 3 columns 1–2; state-year factors refer to controls in Table 3 column 4.

Table 6: Using Labor Supply as an Instrument for Voting (CPS Data)

Instrument:	*MaxEITC*			EITC's Phase-In Rate			Welfare Waiver		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Employed	-1.29			-1.33			-1.39		
	(0.33)			(0.42)			(1.14)		
LFP		-1.21			-1.28			-1.04	
		(0.31)			(0.41)			(0.68)	
Pos. Earnings			-1.08			-1.02			-1.30
			(0.29)			(0.28)			(0.92)
Full controls	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Observations		411,241			411,241			279,898	
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic	16.5	10.2	12.0	8.0	8.4	11.0	2.7	2.8	1.7
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-statistic	18.4	17.9	24.0	12.8	12.1	21.7	4.2	6.8	3.6
First-Stage Estimate	0.34	0.36	0.40	0.48	0.50	0.62	1.15	1.44	1.07
	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.59)	(0.74)	(0.75)

Notes: Sample for columns 1–6 described in Table 4; sample for columns 7–9 described in Table 5. MaxEITC is in $1,000s of 2018 dollars. Phase-in rate in 10 percentage point units, and equal to federal plus state rate. Full set of controls used, listed in Table 2 notes.

Table 7: EITC and Political Identity (GSS Data)

	Political Party Affiliation			Political Ideology			Changes in Behavior		
	Democrat	Indep	Republican	Liberal	Moderate	Conservative	Working	Weekly Work Hours	Politically Informed
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
MaxEITC	-1.75	0.61	1.09	-1.18	0.24	0.58	1.22	0.50	-0.055
	(0.33)	(0.26)	(0.30)	(0.31)	(0.36)	(0.51)	(0.35)	(0.14)	(0.029)
R-squared	0.093	0.053	0.093	0.060	0.047	0.041	0.094	0.114	0.725
Obs.	19,319	19,319	19,319	19,319	19,319	19,319	19,319	19,319	2,399
Mean D.V.	49.2	16.9	33.3	25.0	35.6	27.5	65.4	25.3	1.75

Notes: Data source: 1975–2014 GSS data. MaxEITC is in $1,000s of 2018 dollars. Full set of controls used, listed in Table 2 notes. I define politically informed by averaging 11 standardized variables (e.g., interested in politics, discuss politics, sought political information). Many observations have information on political affiliation and ideology, but not on politically informed. See Table A.11 for more details on this outcome and individual-component regressions.

Table 8: Working, Politically Informed, and Political Identity: Alternate Controls (GSS Data)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Panel A: Outcome = Democrat (Mean = 0.49)								
MaxEITC	-1.8	-1.6	-1.4	-1.6	-1.6	-1.4	-1.4	-1.5
	(0.4)	(0.4)	(0.4)	(0.3)	(0.3)	(0.4)	(0.4)	(0.4)
R-squared	0.035	0.091	0.098	0.099	0.099	0.151	0.194	0.201
Observations	19,319	19,319	19,319	19,319	19,319	19,319	19,319	19,319
Panel B: Outcome = Republican (Mean = 0.33)								
MaxEITC	1.0	1.0	0.9	1.0	1.0	1.2	1.2	1.4
	(0.3)	(0.3)	(0.3)	(0.3)	(0.3)	(0.3)	(0.4)	(0.4)
R-squared	0.037	0.093	0.098	0.099	0.100	0.153	0.194	0.200
Observations	19,319	19,319	19,319	19,319	19,319	19,319	19,319	19,319
Panel C: Outcome = Working (Mean = 0.65)								
MaxEITC	1.1	1.3	1.0	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.8	1.0
	(0.3)	(0.4)	(0.4)	(0.4)	(0.4)	(0.4)	(0.4)	(0.4)
R-squared	0.043	0.093	0.104	0.105	0.106	0.153	0.197	0.203
Observations	19,319	19,319	19,319	19,319	19,319	19,319	19,319	19,319
Panel D: Outcome = Politically Informed (Units are Standard Deviations)								
MaxEITC	-0.06	-0.05	-0.05	-0.06	-0.06	-0.05	-0.03	-0.04
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
R-squared	0.722	0.724	0.733	0.734	0.735	0.752	0.767	0.778
Observations	2,399	2,399	2,399	2,399	2,399	2,399	2,399	2,399
Controls								
State, Year, #Kids FE	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Married	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Age, Race, Educ		X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Married × (St, Yr, Race, Ed)			X	X	X	X	X	X
Annual State Factors				X	X	X	X	X
Married × Annual State Factors					X	X	X	X
State × Year FE						X	X	X
Married × State × Year FE							X	X
State × Number of Kids FE								X

Notes: Data source: 1975–2014 GSS data. MaxEITC is in $1,000s of 2018 dollars. Controls discussed in Table 2 notes. Politically informed discussed in Table 7 notes.

Table 9: EITC's Effects on Voting and Political Affiliation (ANES Data)

Outcome:	Voting	Liberal	Moderate	Conservative	Democrat	Independent	Republican
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Panel A: Demographics Controls							
MaxEITC	-0.35	-1.02	-0.10	0.61	-0.91	-1.16	2.04
	(0.97)	(0.83)	(0.99)	(0.94)	(1.08)	(0.72)	(1.04)
R-squared	0.204	0.083	0.032	0.071	0.106	0.064	0.109
Observations	8,052	8,052	8,052	8,052	8,052	8,052	8,052
Panel B: Add Control for State-Year FE							
MaxEITC	-0.45	-1.09	-0.03	0.79	-0.77	-1.21	2.16
	(1.00)	(0.87)	(1.03)	(0.98)	(1.10)	(0.75)	(1.06)
R-squared	0.257	0.137	0.079	0.117	0.164	0.121	0.165
Observations	8,052	8,052	8,052	8,052	8,052	8,052	8,052
Mean Dep Var	54.0	18.1	26.3	24.8	52.4	14.4	32.4

Notes: Data source: 1974–2004 ANES data. Sample includes all women 18–59 years old. Demographics refer to controls in Table 3 columns 1–2.

Table 10: Welfare Reform's Impact on Political Identity (GSS Data)

	Political Party Affiliation			Political Ideology		
Outcome:	Democrat	Independent	Republican	Liberal	Moderate	Conservative
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
State Welfare Waiver	-3.86	-0.78	4.49	-1.05	-1.03	1.26
× 2+ Kids	(1.69)	(1.46)	(1.95)	(1.53)	(1.49)	(1.82)
R-squared	0.091	0.042	0.092	0.065	0.057	0.045
Observations	13,116	13,116	13,116	13,116	13,116	13,116
Controls						
Demographics	X	X	X	X	X	X
State-Year Factors		X		X		X

Notes: Data source: 1980–2004 GSS data. Full set of controls used, listed in Table 2 notes. Welfare waivers are described in Appendix C.

Table 11: Net Effect on Partisan Voting (GSS Data)

Outcome:	Voted	Voted	Democrat		Voted	Independent		Voted	Republican	
		for Dem.	× Voted	× Not Voted	for 3rd Prty	× Voted	× Not Voted	for Rep.	× Voted	× Not Voted
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Panel A: Full Sample of Women, Ages 18–59										
MaxEITC	-0.05	-1.00	-1.28	-0.46	0.20	0.25	0.36	0.76	0.98	0.11
	(0.39)	(0.47)	(0.31)	(0.28)	(0.15)	(0.19)	(0.24)	(0.44)	(0.31)	(0.21)
R-squared	0.163	0.112	0.094	0.059	0.050	0.018	0.073	0.134	0.104	0.041
Observations	19,319	19,319	19,319	19,319	19,319	19,319	19,319	19,319	19,319	19,319
Mean Dep Var	62.8	31.7	33.1	16.1	4.00	5.63	11.3	27.0	23.9	9.43
Panel B: Younger Sample of Women, Ages 18–45										
MaxEITC	-0.86	-1.29	-1.81	-0.43	-0.03	0.24	0.71	0.47	0.72	0.50
	(0.42)	(0.55)	(0.39)	(0.34)	(0.18)	(0.22)	(0.31)	(0.39)	(0.29)	(0.30)
R-squared	0.162	0.109	0.097	0.059	0.056	0.017	0.075	0.131	0.106	0.044
Observations	13,246	13,246	13,246	13,246	13,246	13,246	13,246	13,246	13,246	13,246
Mean Dep Var	57.8	29.0	30.4	18.0	4.02	5.16	13.0	24.7	22.1	10.8

Notes: Data source: 1975–2014 GSS data. Full set of controls used, listed in Table 2 notes. Outcomes in columns 2, 5, and 8 are self-reported. I construct outcomes in columns 3–4, 6–7, and 9–10 by interacting voting with political party affiliation.

Table 12: EITC's and Welfare Reform's Effects on Being Registered to Vote (CPS Data)

Outcome:	Registered to Vote	Registered and Voted	Registered and Didn't Vote	Registered to Vote	Registered and Voted	Registered and Didn't Vote
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
MaxEITC	-0.10	-0.51	0.41			
	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.08)			
State Welfare Waiver				-0.75	-0.95	0.20
× 2+ Kids				(0.76)	(0.82)	(0.46)
R-squared	0.139	0.180	0.053	0.136	0.177	0.046
Observations	780,035	780,035	780,035	477,340	477,340	477,340

Notes: Data source: 1976–2020 November CPS data. MaxEITC is in $1,000s of 2018 dollars. Full set of controls used, listed in Table 2 notes.

Table 13: Time Spend Working and on Civic Participation (ATUS Data)

Outcome:	Work Hours			Civic Participation		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
MaxEITC	0.81	0.82	1.45	-0.21	-0.22	-0.25
	(0.43)	(0.49)	(0.48)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)
R-squared	0.061	0.066	0.109	0.014	0.016	0.046
Observations	58,090	58,090	58,090	58,090	58,090	58,090
Mean Dep Var	26.1	26.1	26.1	1.96	1.96	1.96
Controls						
State FE, Year FE	X	X	X	X	X	X
Demographics	X	X	X	X	X	X
Interactions		X	X		X	X
State-Year FE			X			X

Notes: Data source: 2003–2018 ATUS data. MaxEITC is in $1,000s of 2018 dollars. Columns 1–2 control for state FE, year FE, and demographics; columns 3–4 add controls for marital status interacted with demographics; and columns 5–6 add state-year FE and state-year-married FE. These three sets of controls are equal to those in Table 8 columns 2, 3, and 7.

Table 14: Why More Conservative? Examining Social and Political Beliefs (GSS Data)

Views on:	Government Policy	Feminism	Racism	Other Hot Button Issues	Religion
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
MaxEITC	2.05	-0.08	1.88	1.21	-0.43
	(0.92)	(0.57)	(0.94)	(0.74)	(0.76)
R-squared	0.099	0.149	0.173	0.118	0.148
Observations	14,242	12,182	16,909	17,416	19,254
Mean Dep Var	-5.47	-14.8	-2.68	-1.38	-2.88

Notes: Data source: 1975–2014 GSS data. MaxEITC is in $1,000s of 2018 dollars. Positive values denote more typically "conservative" views. Full set of controls used, listed in Table 2 notes. Outcomes are created as the average of several standardized variables. Tables A.14–A.18 describe and show regressions for each subcomponent of these outcomes, along with number of observations and means.



Fig. 1. **Unadjusted & Adjusted Voting Trends, Moms vs Women without Kids**

Notes: Author's calculation from 1980–2020 November CPS data. Regression-adjusted trends use full set of controls, listed in Table 2 notes. Panel B normalizes the gap to 1990 levels, and shows unadjusted and regression-adjusted annual trends (using the full set of controls). Post1992 includes 1992.





Fig. 2. **Unadjusted Voting Trends by # of Kids, Moms vs Women without Kids**

Notes: Author's calculation from 1980–2020 November CPS data. Regression-adjusted trends use full set of controls, listed in Table 2 notes. Post1992 includes 1992.



Fig. 3. **Unadjusted Political Identity Trends: 2+ Kids vs 0/1 Kids**

Notes: Author's calculation from 1984–2014 GSS data. Post1992 includes 1992.



Fig. 4. **Regression-Adjusted Political Identity Trends: 2+ Kids vs 0/1 Kids**

Notes: Author's calculation from 1984–2014 GSS data. Regression-adjusted trends use full set of controls, listed in Table 2 notes. This figure normalizes the gap in Figure 3 to 1992 levels, and shows unadjusted and regression-adjusted annual trends (using the full set of controls). Post1992 includes 1992.



Fig. 5. **Effects from the 2009 Federal EITC Expansion, on Moms with 3+ Kids**

Notes: Author's calculation from 1998–2020 November CPS data. Unadjusted trends shown. Voting gap between groups is normalized to 2008 levels.



Panel A: Unadjusted Trends, Relative to Women without Kids



Panel B: Unadj. and Regression-Adj. Trends, Relative to Event Time -2

Fig. 6. **Unadjusted & Adjusted Voting Trends, Moms vs Women without Kids, in Event Time Leading up to State EITC Expansions**

Notes: Author's calculation from 1976–2020 November CPS data. Full set of controls used, listed in Table 2 notes. Panel B normalizes the gap in panel A to event time -2 levels. Post years begin in event time 0.



Fig. 7. **Unadjusted Female Voting Trends by Subgroup**

Notes: Author's calculation from 1976–2020 November CPS data.



Fig. 8. **Unadjusted Female Voting Trends by State and Year**

Notes: Author's calculation from 1976–2020 November CPS data.



Fig. 9. **Unadjusted Trends in Female Working and/or Voting, Over Time**

Notes: Author's calculation from 1976–2020 March and November CPS data.



Fig. 10. **Fraction of Women Voting by Weekly Work Hours**

Notes: Author's calculation from 1976–2020 March and November CPS data. Panels A–F suggest that working women with kids find it difficult to both work and vote, while women without kids do not face the same constraints.



Fig. 11. **Correlation Between Female Working and Voting, Over Time**

Notes: Author's calculation from 1976–2020 March and November CPS data. Regression adjusted trend uses demographics controls in Table 3 columns 1–2.



Fig. 12. **State-Level Increases in Female Working Led to Lower Female Voting**

Notes: Author's calculation from 1976–2020 March and November CPS data. I compare state averages in 1976–1988 with 2000–2020. Figure weights by the 1980 state female population; the unweighted estimate is larger: 0.70 percentage points. Circle sizes reflect 1980 state female population.



Fig. 13. **Double Residual Regression: Locally Linear Regression**

Notes: Data source: 1976–2020 November CPS data and 1975–2014 GSS data. Panel A uses CPS data and panels B–D use GSS data. A bandwidth of 0.8 is used, as is running-line least squares smoothing, and a tricube weighting function. I do not show conservative for space reasons: conservative as an outcome yields a relatively flat negative pattern.



Fig. 14. **Effects of EITC on Political Party Affiliation, by Subgroup**

Notes: Data source: 1975–2014 GSS data. MaxEITC is in $1,000s of 2018 dollars. Full set of controls used, listed in Table 2 notes.

Online Appendix: Additional Figures and Tables

"Does Working Cause Women To Become More Conservative and Less Likely to Vote?"

Jacob Bastian[1]

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Table A.1: Testing the Exogeneity of State EITCs

	Max State EITC Benefits				State EITC Rates (% of Federal EITC)			
	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)	
State Unemp Rate	1.1	(2.3)	2.0	(2.2)	2.0	(3.7)	3.4	(3.5)
State GDP Growth	1.4	(3.0)	1.3	(3.0)	1.1	(4.8)	0.1	(4.7)
State GDP	2.1	(1.5)	2.1	(1.4)	3.0	(2.3)	3.1	(2.2)
State Welfare Waiver	-1.4	(0.8)	-0.8	(0.6)	-3.1*	(1.3)	-2.1	(1.1)
Max TANF with 1 Child	0.4	(0.9)	0.2	(1.0)	-2.8	(1.5)	-2.9	(1.5)
Max TANF with 2 Children	0.9	(1.0)	1.2	(1.1)	1.7	(1.4)	2.2	(1.5)
Max TANF with 3 Children	-1.0	(0.6)	-1.2	(0.7)	0.5	(1.2)	0.06	(1.2)
State Min Wage	-2.7	(1.4)	-2.3	(1.3)	-4.7*	(2.2)	-4.3*	(2.0)
Avg Number of Kids	-2.5	(4.7)	-2.7	(4.5)	-5.5	(7.3)	-6.0	(6.9)
Avg Age	-1.9	(1.7)	-1.8	(1.6)	-2.7	(2.2)	-2.7	(2.1)
Fraction White	-0.2	(1.1)	-0.4	(1.0)	-0.3	(1.6)	-0.6	(1.5)
Fraction Black	-1.3	(1.1)	-1.6	(1.1)	-1.4	(1.8)	-2.3	(1.7)
Fraction <12 Years Educ	0.1	(0.8)	0.03	(0.8)	0.7	(1.3)	0.6	(1.3)
Fraction =12 Years Educ	-1.2	(0.6)	-1.1	(0.6)	-1.4	(1.0)	-1.3	(1.0)
Fraction Married	0.3	(0.7)	0.1	(0.7)	0.8	(1.0)	0.6	(1.0)
Lagged State Unemp Rate			-1.4	(1.5)			-2.8	(2.4)
Lagged State GDP Growth			-0.9	(3.4)			-2.6	(5.5)
Lagged State GDP			-0.10	(0.6)			-0.3	(0.8)
Lagged State Welfare Waiver			-1.0	(0.6)			-1.6	(1.0)
Lagged Max TANF with 1 Child			0.4	(0.6)			0.04	(1.0)
Lagged Max TANF with 2 Children			-0.1	(1.0)			0.2	(1.6)
Lagged Max TANF with 3 Children			-0.07	(0.8)			-0.06	(1.2)
Lagged State Min Wage			-2.5	(1.9)			-3.4	(3.0)
Lagged Avg Number of Kids			-2.6	(2.9)			-5.5	(4.7)
Lagged Avg Age			1.3	(1.7)			3.7	(2.7)
Lagged Fraction White			0.1	(0.9)			0.02	(1.5)
Lagged Fraction Black			0.1	(1.3)			0.7	(2.0)
Lagged Fraction <12 Years Educ			0.8	(0.8)			1.7	(1.3)
Lagged Fraction =12 Years Educ			1.0	(0.7)			1.5	(1.1)
Lagged Fraction Married			0.9	(0.6)			1.5	(0.9)
R-squared	0.892		0.894		0.906		0.908	
Observations	816		816		816		816	
Mean Dep Var	372.8		372.8		631.3		631.3	
Testing Joint Significance P-Value	0.041		0.033		0.067		0.000	

Notes: Observations at the state-by-year level. Each regression controls for state FE, year FE, and state time trends. All dollars are in real CPI-adjusted 2018 dollars. EITC data from NBER and IRS. Unemployment rates from BLS. GDP from BEA regional data. Minimum wage from the Tax Policy Center's Tax Facts. Welfare benefits from the Urban Institute's Welfare Rules Database. Maximum state EITC benefits are for families with 3+ children. State EITC rates in percentage points. Annual state average demographic traits calculated by author from CPS data using the sample of all adults at least 18 years old. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

Table A.2: Working More and Voting Less: Correlations by Subgroup, with/without Controls (CPS Data)

Sample of Women	All		Mothers		Non-Mothers		Married		Unmarried		≤12 Yrs Ed		≥13 Yrs Ed	
Controls?	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)
Panel A: Does Working Affect Likelihood of Voting?														
Weekly Work Hours	0.48	-0.97	-0.55	-0.41	1.46	-1.00	0.34	-0.39	1.21	-0.95	-0.39	-1.36	0.20	-0.25
(10 Hour Units)	(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.21)	(0.16)	(0.20)	(0.22)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.36)	(0.33)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.22)	(0.19)
R-squared	0.000	0.182	0.000	0.202	0.000	0.171	0.000	0.176	0.000	0.168	0.000	0.145	0.000	0.125
Observations	493,048		231,437		261,611		302,051		190,997		332,802		160,246	
Panel B: Conditional on Working, Do Work Hours Affect Voting?														
Weekly Work Hours	-0.23	-0.22	-0.47	-0.27	-0.02	-0.13	0.06	-0.08	-0.21	-0.28	-0.26	-0.19	-0.45	-0.25
(10 Hour Units)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.15)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.12)	(0.20)	(0.19)	(0.14)	(0.12)	(0.19)	(0.18)
R-squared	0.000	0.189	0.000	0.210	0.000	0.177	0.000	0.174	0.000	0.179	0.000	0.150	0.000	0.123
Observations	160,252		75,713		84,539		92,182		68,070		94,020		66,232	

Notes: Data source: 1976–2020 November CPS data. Controls include demographic controls from Table 3 column 2.

Table A.3: EITC and Voting in Presidential or Midterm Elections, Alt. Controls (CPS Data)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Panel A: Voting in Presidential Elections (Mean=68)								
MaxEITC	-0.59	-0.77	-0.53	-0.52	-0.51	-0.46	-0.45	-0.43
	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.13)
R-squared	0.041	0.147	0.149	0.149	0.149	0.153	0.154	0.155
Observations	403,047	403,047	403,047	403,047	403,047	403,047	403,047	403,047
Panel B: Voting in Midterm Elections (Mean=49)								
MaxEITC	-0.46	-0.74	-0.60	-0.54	-0.54	-0.52	-0.51	-0.49
	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)
R-squared	0.048	0.151	0.153	0.154	0.154	0.162	0.163	0.164
Observations	376,988	376,988	376,988	376,988	376,988	376,988	376,988	376,988
Controls								
State, Year, #Kids FE	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Married	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Age, Race, Educ		X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Mar × (St, Yr, Race, Ed)			X	X	X	X	X	X
Annual State Factors				X	X	X	X	X
Mar. × State Factors					X	X	X	X
State × Year FE						X	X	X
Mar × St × Year FE							X	X
State × #Kids FE								X

Notes: Data source: 1976–2020 November CPS data. MaxEITC is in $1,000s of 2018 dollars. Controls discussed in Table 2 notes.

Table A.4: Isolating Effects of 2009 Federal EITC Expansion (CPS Data)

Outcome:	Voting	Employed	LFP	Voting	Employed	LFP
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A: Mothers with 3+ Kids vs All Other Women						
3+ Kids × Post2009	-1.62	0.98	1.08	-2.15	0.86	0.98
	(0.69)	(0.98)	(1.01)	(0.63)	(0.97)	(1.01)
R-squared	0.057	0.002	0.002	0.187	0.008	0.008
Observations	279,872	178,254	178,254	279,872	178,254	178,254
Panel B: Mothers with 3+ Kids vs All Other Mothers						
3+ Kids × Post2009	-1.86	1.25	1.17	-1.53	1.28	1.23
	(0.68)	(0.97)	(1.02)	(0.56)	(0.97)	(1.02)
R-squared	0.057	0.001	0.001	0.206	0.003	0.003
Observations	122,532	81,081	81,081	122,532	81,081	81,081
Panel C: Mothers with 3+ Kids vs Mothers with 2 Kids						
3+ Kids × Post2009	-1.60	0.70	0.86	-1.27	0.72	0.90
	(0.76)	(1.01)	(1.04)	(0.64)	(1.01)	(1.04)
R-squared	0.058	0.001	0.001	0.212	0.002	0.003
Observations	80,412	53,574	53,574	80,412	53,574	53,574
Controls						
Year FE, #Kids FE	X	X	X	X	X	X
Full Controls				X	X	X

Notes: Data source: 2000–2016 CPS data. *MaxEITC* increased by about $1,000 for mothers with 3+ kids in 2009. Full set of controls listed in Table 2 notes. Results correspond to Figure 5.

Table A.5: EITC and Voting: Alternate EITC Measures (CPS Data)

	Total MaxEITC (1)	Federal MaxEITC (2)	State MaxEITC (3)	EITC Phase-In Rate (4)
Panel A: Average Effect on Voting				
EITC	-0.50	-0.55	-0.89	-0.84
	(0.10)	(0.13)	(0.42)	(0.21)
R-squared	0.180	0.180	0.180	0.180
Observations	780,035	780,035	780,035	780,035
Panel B: Effects by Marital Status				
EITC × Married	0.08	0.11	0.43	0.27
	(0.09)	(0.13)	(0.38)	(0.21)
EITC × Unmarried	-1.45	-1.56	-3.99	-2.19
	(0.13)	(0.15)	(0.67)	(0.24)
R-squared	0.181	0.181	0.181	0.181
Observations	780,035	780,035	780,035	780,035

Notes: Data source: 1976–2020 November CPS data. MaxEITC is in $1,000s of 2018 dollars. Phase-in rate units are 10 percentage points. Full set of controls used, listed in Table 2 notes.

Table A.6: EITC and Voting: Alternate Sample Years (CPS Data)

Sample Years	1976–2020 (1)	1976–1992 (2)	1982–1992 (3)	1988–1998 (4)	2000–2020 (5)
Panel A: Average Effect on Voting					
MaxEITC	-0.51	-1.27	-1.16	-0.40	-0.52
	(0.10)	(0.44)	(0.47)	(0.19)	(0.41)
R-squared	0.180	0.174	0.176	0.176	0.187
Observations	780,035	354,509	234,503	211,378	327,689
Panel B: Effects by Marital Status					
MaxEITC × Married	0.07	0.64	0.65	0.18	-0.11
	(0.09)	(0.53)	(0.48)	(0.19)	(0.42)
MaxEITC × Unmarried	-1.45	-4.14	-3.78	-1.59	-1.36
	(0.13)	(0.51)	(0.54)	(0.26)	(0.43)
R-squared	0.181	0.176	0.178	0.177	0.188
Observations	780,035	354,509	234,503	211,378	327,689

Notes: Data source: 1976–2020 November CPS data. MaxEITC is in $1,000s of 2018 dollars. Full set of controls used, listed in Table 2 notes.

Table A.7: EITC and Voting: Alternate Comparison Groups (CPS Data)

Sample Years	1976–2020			2006–2020		
Sample of Women	All	≥1 Kid	≥2 Kids	All	≥1 Kid	≥2 Kids
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
MaxEITC	-0.51	-0.82	-0.57	-0.72	-1.23	-0.97
	(0.10)	(0.18)	(0.58)	(0.43)	(0.55)	(0.57)
R-squared	0.180	0.202	0.205	0.188	0.213	0.218
Observations	780,035	354,117	234,508	228,777	97,103	64,071

Notes: Data source: 1976–2020 November CPS data. MaxEITC is in $1,000s of 2018 dollars. Full set of controls used, listed in Table 2 notes.

Table A.8: Restricting Sample by Marital Status (CPS Data)

Sample:	Unmarried Women		Married Women	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
MaxEITC	-0.51	-0.49	-0.19	-0.08
	(0.18)	(0.21)	(0.11)	(0.12)
R-squared	0.163	0.173	0.179	0.187
Observations	307,445	307,445	472,590	472,590
Controls				
Full Controls	X	X	X	X
State × Year FE		X		X
State × #Kids FE		X		X

Notes: Data source: 1976–2020 November CPS data. MaxEITC is in $1,000s of 2018 dollars. Full set of controls used, listed in Table 2 notes. Controls in columns 1 and 3 correspond to controls in Table 3 column 5; controls in columns 2 and 4 correspond to controls in Table 3 column 8.

Table A.9: EITC and Voting: Alternate Specifications (CPS Data)

Specification	OLS		Logit		Probit	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
MaxEITC	-0.51		-0.60		-0.57	
	(0.10)		(0.10)		(0.10)	
MaxEITC × Married		0.07		0.00		0.02
		(0.09)		(0.09)		(0.09)
MaxEITC × Unmarried		-1.45		-1.46		-1.43
		(0.13)		(0.13)		(0.13)
R-squared	0.180	0.181				
Observations	780,035	780,035	780,035	780,035	780,035	780,035

Notes: Data source: 1976–2020 November CPS data. MaxEITC is in $1,000s of 2018 dollars. Full set of controls used, listed in Table 2 notes.

Table A.10: EITC and Political Identity: Alt. Specifications (GSS Data)

	Democrat		Republican		Liberal		Conservative	
Specification	Logit	Probit	Logit	Probit	Logit	Probit	Logit	Probit
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
MaxEITC	-1.61	-1.58	0.95	0.95	-1.31	-1.32	0.66	0.66
	(0.34)	(0.34)	(0.32)	(0.31)	(0.36)	(0.35)	(0.53)	(0.52)
Observations	19,317	19,317	19,317	19,317	19,317	19,317	19,317	19,317

Notes: Data source: 1975–2014 GSS data. MaxEITC is in $1,000s of 2018 dollars. Full set of controls used, listed in Table 2 notes.

Table A.11: Decomposing Politically Informed (from Table 7 Column 9)

Outcome	Interested in Politics?	Ever Demonstrated?	Attended a Rally?	Boycott?	Political Media?	Donated to Political Cause?	Discuss Discuss	Share Political Views?	Signed Petition?	How Int. in Politics?	Politically Informed?
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
MaxEITC	-0.03	-0.04	-0.03	-0.01	-0.01	-0.00	-0.03	-0.00	-0.01	-0.03	-0.04
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
R-squared	0.758	0.063	0.081	0.111	0.072	0.069	0.115	0.076	0.075	0.090	0.096
Observations	2,399	2,399	2,399	2,399	2,399	2,399	2,399	2,399	2,399	2,399	2,399
Mean Dep Var	0.095	0.010	-0.010	0.033	-0.023	0.002	-0.036	-0.037	-0.005	-0.070	-0.060

Notes: Data source: 1975–2014 GSS data. MaxEITC is in $1,000s of 2018 dollars. Full set of controls used, listed in Table 2 notes. Outcomes all measured in standard deviations.

Table A.12: Summary Statistics (ANES Data)

	All Women		All Mothers	
	Mean (1)	S.D. (2)	Mean (3)	S.D. (4)
Number of Kids	1.09	1.22	1.93	1.01
Age	36.8	11.3	35.1	9.76
Married	0.62	0.49	0.68	0.47
HS Dropout	0.18	0.39	0.21	0.40
HS Graduate	0.40	0.49	0.43	0.50
Some College	0.41	0.49	0.36	0.48
White	0.78	0.42	0.76	0.43
Black	0.13	0.34	0.14	0.35
Hispanic	0.070	0.26	0.075	0.26
Other Race	0.021	0.14	0.020	0.14
Max Possible EITC (1,000s)	1.13	1.25	1.67	1.24
Voted Last Election	54.0	49.8	51.8	50.0
Liberal	18.1	38.5	16.2	36.9
Moderate	26.3	44.1	26.9	44.3
Conservative	24.8	43.2	24.2	42.8
Democrat	52.4	49.9	52.0	50.0
Independent	14.4	35.1	15.7	36.3
Republican	32.4	46.8	31.6	46.5
Observations	8,052		5,052	

Notes: 2003–2018 ATUS data. Sample includes all mothers 18–49 years old. All dollars are real CPI-adjusted 2018 dollars.

Table A.13: Summary Statistics (ATUS Data)

	All Women		All Mothers	
	Mean (1)	S.D. (2)	Mean (3)	S.D. (4)
Number of Kids	1.20	1.25	1.86	1.10
Age	33.8	9.26	35.1	8.72
Birth Year	1976.5	10.5	1975.1	9.85
Married	0.52	0.50	0.64	0.48
HS Graduate	0.89	0.32	0.86	0.34
Some College	0.63	0.48	0.58	0.49
College Graduate	0.33	0.47	0.29	0.45
Black	0.13	0.34	0.14	0.34
Hispanic	0.17	0.38	0.20	0.40
Employed	0.71	0.45	0.67	0.47
Individual Earnings (1,000s)	25.8	30.6	23.5	30.1
Household Income (1,000s)	65.8	48.2	66.1	48.6
Max Possible EITC (1,000s)	3.34	2.47	4.86	1.68
EITC Benefit Eligibility (100s)	6.68	15.2	10.2	17.9
EITC Eligible	0.24	0.43	0.34	0.47
Observations	58,090		43,685	

Notes: 2003–2018 ATUS data. Sample includes all women 18–49 years old. All dollars are real CPI-adjusted 2018 dollars. EITC benefits calculated using TAXSIM. Table is similar to Table B.1 in Bastian and Lochner (2020).

Table A.14: Decomposing Government Policy (from Table 14 Column 1)

Gov Policy:	Welfare	Jobs for All	Reduce Income Ineq.	Health-Care for All	Help Elderly	Help Unemp.	Cut Spend.	Less Bus. Reg.	Reduce Income Ineq.	Income Ineq. Too High	Taxes on Rich Too High	Middle Inc. Taxes High High	Rich Should Pay More Taxes
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)
MaxEITC	0.8	5.0	5.3	6.3	1.3	4.4	6.4	0.8	2.5	2.4	1.0	5.0	0.7
	(1.2)	(2.4)	(2.6)	(3.7)	(2.7)	(2.8)	(3.2)	(2.6)	(2.1)	(3.3)	(2.2)	(4.2)	(4.3)
R-squared	0.106	0.172	0.099	0.131	0.108	0.159	0.117	0.069	0.102	0.064	0.113	0.075	0.068
Obs.	10,312	2,925	2,411	1,575	1,974	1,962	1,593	1,588	3,736	1,879	1,783	1,513	1,328
Unique Years	27	7	6	4	5	5	4	4	7	4	4	3	3
Mean D.V.	-4.05	-12.2	-9.86	-8.27	-13.1	-6.25	-11.4	-13.5	-12.0	-5.92	1.30	5.12	0.17

Notes: Data source: 1975–2014 GSS data. MaxEITC is in $1,000s of 2018 dollars. Full set of controls used, listed in Table 2 notes.

Table A.15: Decomposing Feminism (from Table 14 Column 2)

Attitude about Women:	Should Take Care of Home	Should Not Work	Would Vote Female Pres.	Not Suited for Politics	Should Help Husband's Career	Kids Suffer if Mom Works	Should Tend Home	Divorce Laws
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
MaxEITC	-0.5	0.9	0.3	-0.1	-0.3	0.5	2.0	-2.3
	(1.3)	(1.3)	(1.0)	(1.3)	(1.5)	(1.2)	(0.9)	(1.0)
R-squared	0.129	0.058	0.056	0.086	0.181	0.076	0.110	0.102
Observations	7,587	7,638	8,499	10,939	5,659	9,629	9,604	11,442
Mean Dep Var	-16.6	-11.7	-11.6	-11.7	-25.8	-23.7	-23.1	-4.35

Notes: Data source: 1975–2014 GSS data. MaxEITC is in $1,000s of 2018 dollars. Full set of controls used, listed in Table 2 notes.

Table A.16: Decomposing Racism (from Table 14 Column 3)

Attitudes:	Whites Hurt by Affirm. Action	No Black Affirmative Action	Gov't Shouldn't Help Blacks	Racial Outcome Gaps Not due to Discrimination	Racial Outcome Gaps due to Lack of Will	Banning Interracial Marriage
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
MaxEITC	0.4	4.6	1.0	1.1	3.1	1.5
	(1.8)	(4.1)	(1.4)	(1.9)	(1.3)	(1.2)
R-squared	0.084	0.149	0.177	0.092	0.076	0.188
Observations	5,527	5,687	10,402	9,226	9,168	8,631
Unique Years	12	11	21	19	19	18
Mean Dep Var	-1.76	-5.35	-5.19	-5.65	-9.95	0.0097

Notes: Data source: 1975–2014 GSS data. MaxEITC is in $1,000s of 2018 dollars. Full set of controls used, listed in Table 2 notes.

Table A.17: Decomposing Other Hot Button Issues (from Table 14 Column 4)

Attitude:	Anti Pro-Choice	Anti Gay Rights	Anti Gun Permits	Anti Legal Weed
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
MaxEITC	0.5	0.7	-0.2	1.1
	(0.6)	(1.3)	(0.4)	(0.6)
R-squared	0.099	0.209	0.052	0.097
Observations	12,118	10,979	11,701	11,364
Unique Years	24	23	24	24
Mean Dep Var	57.9	-12.4	16.9	73.4

Notes: Data source: 1975–2014 GSS data. MaxEITC is in $1,000s of 2018 dollars. Full set of controls used, listed in Table 2 notes.

Table A.18: Decomposing Religious (from Table 14 Column 5)

Religious Outcome:	Attendance	Fundamentalism	Prayer	Faith Over Science
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
MaxEITC	-1.7	-0.3	0.8	-0.8
	(1.0)	(0.9)	(1.1)	(4.5)
R-squared	0.083	0.166	0.104	0.127
Observations	17,483	18,537	10,950	1,936
Unique Years	27	27	19	4
Mean Dep Var	-0.64	0.11	-0.064	-0.56

Notes: Data source: 1975–2014 GSS data. MaxEITC is in $1,000s of 2018 dollars. Full set of controls used, listed in Table 2 notes.



Fig. A.1. Federal EITC Structure, 2017

Notes: Source: Bastian and Lochner (2020).



Fig. A.2. Maximum Possible Federal EITC Over Time

Notes: Source: Bastian and Lochner (2020).



Fig. A.3. State EITC Rates (as a Fraction of Federal Benefits) Over Time

Notes: Source: Bastian and Lochner (2020).



Fig. A.4. Maximum Possible Federal + State EITC ($MaxEITC$) Over Time

Notes: Source: Bastian and Lochner (2020).



Fig. A.5. Histogram of $MaxEITC$

Notes: Author's calculation from 1976–2020 November CPS data.



Fig. A.6. **Voting Trends by Education**

Notes: Author's calculation from 1976–2020 November CPS data.



Fig. A.7. **Voting Trends by Race**

Notes: Author's calculation from 1976–2020 November CPS data.



Fig. A.8. **Voting Trends by Marriage**

Notes: Author's calculation from 1976–2020 November CPS data.



Fig. A.9. **Effects of EITC on Political Party Affiliation**

Notes: Data source: 1975–2014 GSS data. MaxEITC is in $1,000s of 2018 dollars. Full set of controls used, listed in Table 2 notes.



Fig. A.10. **Religious**

Notes: Author's calculation from 1975–2014 GSS data. Figure A.10 looks at four measures of religiosity: religious attendance, religious fundamentalism, whether one believes in a God, how often one prays, and whether society relies too much on science and not enough on faith. Panels A and B show that each $1,000 in $MaxEITC$ decreases never/rarely attending church, increases sometimes attending church, and has no effect on weekly attendance. Panel C shows suggestive evidence of being less religiously liberal, and more religiously moderate. Panel D shows little effect on believing in a God. Panel E suggests some decrease in how often one prays. Panel F shows little effect on whether society relies too much on science and not enough on faith.

Appendix C: Welfare Reform

Up through the late 1980s, Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) benefits were available to low-income families with children. Benefits varied by state and number of children, and phased-out with earned income. While benefits varied by household size and number of children, the majority of the variation in welfare benefits can be explained by differences by state (65 percent) rather than differences by number of children (20 percent).[2] Most AFDC recipients were unmarried mothers with children. Benefits were paid out every month and there was no time limit on how long households could receive AFDC benefits.

Starting in 1992, states began to implement welfare waivers and limit access to welfare benefits. There were six types of waivers: (1) Time limits on how long families could receive welfare benefits, ranging from 24 to 60 months. (2) Work requirements that went into effect after recipients had received welfare for a specified length of time. (3) Requirements that individuals participate in education, training, and job search activities after recipients had received welfare for a specified length of time. (4) Allowing families with young children (e.g. under age three) to be exempted from waivers #2 and #3; (5) Capping welfare benefits at a certain number of children. (6) Increasing the earnings disregard, in an attempt to reduce the labor supply disincentive. See Table C.1 for details on when states approved and implemented each type of waiver.[3]

In August 1996, AFDC was completely overhauled through Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) and was renamed Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF). This reform included the six waivers discussed above. Under TANF, states had to follow some federal guidelines, but still had the ability to design their own TANF program. For example, benefit generosity had no limit, but time limits could be no more than 60 months.

Figure C.1 Panels A-D show trends in welfare generosity and caseloads between 1980 and 2018. Panel A shows trends in the state monthly welfare benefits for a family of four. States have steadily decreased welfare generosity over time. The average maximum in state welfare benefits fell from $960 in 1980, to $780 in 1990, to $660 in 2000, to $570 in 2010, to $540 in 2018. The figure also shows trends for the most and least generous states, as well as the 25th and 75th percentiles. Benefits in the most generous state fell from about $1,660 to $1,060, and from about $330 to $190 in the least generous state. Panel B shows trends in the fraction of a state's population receiving welfare benefits. The average fraction fell from 4.2 percent in 1980, to 4.0 percent in 1990, to 1.9 percent in 2000, to 1.2 percent in

[2]Estimates come from the R-squared from regressing maximum welfare benefits on state FE or number of kids FE, using the main sample.

[3]Source for Table C.1: Health and Human Services (1999). https://aspe.hhs.gov/report/state-implementation-major-changes-welfare-policies-1992-1998.

2010, to 0.6 percent in 2018. In the states with the highest and lowest fraction receiving welfare, the fraction fell from 13.3 to 2.0 percent and 2.1 to 0.1 percent, respectively. Panels C and D show similar trends for the absolute number of welfare recipients. Overall, welfare benefit generosity has steadily decreased over time, while caseloads also steadily decreased over time, except for a sharp and temporary increase in the early 1990s.



Fig. C.1. Trends in State Welfare Benefits and Welfare Recipients

Notes: 1980–2018 welfare data from University of Kentucky Center for Poverty Research: http://ukcpr.org/resources/national-welfare-data.

Table C.1A: Approval and Implementation Dates of AFDC Waivers Policies, 1992-1996

State	Termination/reduction time limit		Changes in JOBS work exemptions		JOBS sanctions	
	Approved	Implemented	Approved	Implemented	Approved	Implemented
Alabama						
Alaska						
Arizona	5/22/95	11/1/95			5/22/95	11/1/95
Arkansas						
California						
Colorado						
Connecticut	12/8/95	1/1/96	8/29/94	1/1/96	8/29/94	1/1/96
Delaware	5/8/95		5/8/95		5/8/95	
Dist. of Columbia						
Florida			6/26/96			
Georgia					11/1/93	1/1/94
Hawaii	8/16/1996	2/1/1997	6/24/94	2/1/97		
Idaho			8/19/96		8/19/96	
Illinois		2/1/96	9/30/95		9/30/95	10/1/95
Indiana	12/15/94		12/15/94	5/1/95	12/15/94	5/1/95
Iowa	8/13/93	10/1/93	8/13/93	10/1/93	8/13/93	10/1/93
Kansas						
Kentucky						
Louisiana						
Maine			6/10/96			
Maryland			8/16/96	10/1/96	8/16/96	10/1/96
Massachusetts			8/4/95	11/1/95	8/4/95	11/1/95
Michigan			10/6/94	10/6/94	10/6/94	10/6/94
Minnesota						
Mississippi						
Missouri					4/18/95	6/1/95
Montana			4/18/95		4/18/95	
Nebraska	2/27/95		2/27/95		2/27/95	
Nevada						
New Hampshire			6/18/96		6/18/96	
New Jersey			7/1/92	10/1/92	7/1/92	10/1/92
New Mexico						
New York						
North Carolina	2/5/96	7/1/96	2/5/96	7/1/96	2/5/96	7/1/96
North Dakota						
Ohio	3/13/96				3/13/96	7/1/96
Oklahoma						
Oregon	3/28/96	7/1/96	7/15/92	2/1/93	3/28/96	7/1/96
Pennsylvania						
Rhode Island						
South Carolina	5/3/96		5/3/96		5/3/96	
South Dakota					3/14/94	6/1/94
Tennessee	7/25/96		7/25/96	9/1/96	7/25/96	9/1/96
Texas	3/22/96		3/22/96	6/1/96	3/22/96	6/1/96
Utah			10/5/92	1/1/93	10/5/92	6/1/96
Vermont			4/12/93	7/1/94	4/12/93	7/1/94
Virginia	7/1/95		7/1/95		7/1/95	
Washington	9/29/95	1/1/96				
West Virginia					7/31/95	2/1/96
Wisconsin			8/14/95	1/1/96	8/14/95	1/1/96
Wyoming						

Table C.1B: Approval and Implementation Dates of AFDC Waivers Policies, 1992-1996

State	Increased earnings disregard		Family Cap		Work requirement time limit	
	Approved	Implemented	Approved	Implemented	Approved	Implemented
Alabama						
Alaska						
Arizona			5/22/95	11/1/95		
Arkansas			4/5/94	7/1/94		
California	10/29/92	12/1/92	8/19/96	9/1/97	9/11/95	9/11/95
Colorado						
Connecticut	8/29/94	1/1/96	12/18/95	1/1/96		
Delaware	5/8/95		10/1/95		5/8/95	10/1/95
Dist. of Columbia						
Florida			6/26/96			
Georgia	6/24/94		11/1/93	1/1/94		
Hawaii	8/16/1996	2/1/1997				
Idaho						
Illinois	11/23/93	11/23/93	9/30/95	12/1/95		
Indiana			12/15/94	5/1/95		
Iowa	8/13/93	10/1/93				
Kansas						
Kentucky						
Louisiana						
Maine						
Maryland	8/16/96	10/1/96	8/14/95	3/1/96		
Massachusetts	8/4/95	11/1/95	8/4/95	11/1/95 8/4/95	11/1/95	
Michigan	8/1/92	10/1/92			8/1/92	
Minnesota						
Mississippi			9/1/95	10/1/95		
Missouri					4/18/95	
Montana	4/18/95				4/18/95	2/1/96
Nebraska	2/27/95		2/27/95	11/1/96		
Nevada						
New Hampshire	6/18/96				6/18/96	
New Jersey	7/1/92		7/1/92	10/1/92		
New Mexico						
New York						
North Carolina			2/5/96	7/1/96		
North Dakota						
Ohio	3/13/96	7/1/96				
Oklahoma						
Oregon						
Pennsylvania						
Rhode Island						
South Carolina			5/3/96			
South Dakota					3/14/94	6/1/94
Tennessee	7/25/96	9/1/96	7/25/96			
Texas						
Utah	10/5/92					
Vermont	4/12/93	7/1/94				
Virginia	7/1/95		7/1/95	7/1/95	7/1/95	7/1/95
Washington						
West Virginia						
Wisconsin			6/24/94	1/1/96	9/30/96	9/30/96
Wyoming						